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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent; 
v. 
CHARLES EARL GUESS; 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Docket No. 39646-2012 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District for Latah County, the 
Honorable John R. Stegner presiding. 
Roderick C. Bond of Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC, 800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 
400, Bellevue, WA 98004, for the Defendant-Appellant Charles Earl Guess. 
The Honorable Lawrence O. Wasden, Attorney General for the State ofIdaho, and Lori 
A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General for the State ofIdaho, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-
0010, for the Plaintiff-Respondent State of Idaho. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Charles Earl Guess ("Charles") is a 73-year-old man who, pursuant to the terms of a Rule 
11 Plea Agreement, pled guilty to Aggravated Assault in exchange for a withheld judgment. 
(App., A-B.) At the hearing held to accept the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, Judge Stegner 
questioned Charles about his understanding of that Agreement: "1 am pleading guilty to this 
charge .. .if I fulfill the period of probation without any problems in that period of time ... the 
felony charges ... would be dropped." (App., C, p. 77, L. 16,20-23.) Judge Stegner agreed that 
Charles' understanding was correct: "Well, Mr. Guess ... I think you understand what a withheld 
judgment means." (App., C, p. 78, L. 8-9.). After Charles completed his sentence and probation, 
he moved to have his guilty plea set aside. The district court found: "1 have a defendant who has 
performed as well as any defendant I can remember while on probation," but denied the Motion. 
(App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 & D.) Consequently, Charles moved to enforce the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement by asserting, inter alias, that "[a]llowing the government to breach a promise that 
induced a guilty plea violates due process" (Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir. 
1994) and it must be enforced "[fJocusing on the defendant's reasonable understanding." State 
v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595-96, 226 P.3d 535, 538 (2010) ("[W]hen a plea rests ... on a 
promise ... so that it can be said to be part of the consideration, such promise must be fulfilled") 
(citations omitted). Despite Charles' clear reasonable understanding of the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement, the district court denied the Motion. (App., E.) The Court should reverse and remand 
with instructions to set aside his guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore all of his civil rights. 
1 
B. Statement of Facts and Procedural History. 
The following Statement of Facts and Procedural History ("Facts") and all citations to the 
record and the transcript are incorporated by reference into all of the arguments in Section IV. 
Charles is 73-years-old and has resided in Moscow, Idaho for over thirty-seven years. (R. 
Vol. T, p. 17, Vol. IT, p. 245, ~3.) On April 26, 2006, Charles was charged with two counts of 
Aggravated Assault and one count of Domestic Violence Battery involving his ex-wife, Michele 
Guess ("Michele") and her attorney. (R. Vol. I, p. 16-17, Vol. II, p. 245, ~3; Tr., p. 112.) Other 
than traffic infractions, Charles had never been arrested, charged with any criminal offense or 
accused of domestic violence. (R. Vol. IT, p. 245, ~3.) On June 16, 2006, the Complaint was 
amended based upon a Rule 11 Plea Agreement wherein Charles agreed to plead guilty to 
Aggravated Assault in exchange for a withheld judgment, probation not to exceed five years and 
other agreed terms. (App., A; R. Vol. I, p. 49-50.) Charles testified as to his understanding: 
Based upon my understanding that I would receive a withheld judgment and that 
my guilty plea would be set aside in no more than five years if I complied with all 
the terms of my sentence and probation under the tenns of the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement (and that no trace of this action would be on my record), I agreed to 
wave my right to a jury trial and pled guilty to one of the three charges. 
I cherish my civil rights. Having my civil rights is extremely important to me and 
this is one of the material reasons why I agreed to be bound by the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement. I wanted to be able to once again enjoy all my civil liberties. I I 
understood my obligations under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and pledged to 
comply with those obligations. In return, I had the expectation that if I complied 
with my obligations that I would be permitted to withdraw my guilty plea, have 
this case dismissed and have my cherished civil rights restored. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 245-46, ~~4 & 6.) The district court confinned Charles' reasonable understanding: 
1 Charles is an avid ouldoorsman and hunter. Thus, his right to possess fireanns for hunting was one of tile 
inducements for him to plead guilly through the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (R. Vol. II, p. 19-i, 2-i5--i6, ';~-i & 6.) 
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(The Court): And my understanding is that you're pleading pursuant to a Rule 11 
Agreement; is that correct? 
(The Defendant): Yes. 
(The Court): Why don't you explain to me what your understanding is of what 
will happen to you ifI accept that plea. 
(The Defendant): Well, my understanding is there will be a presentencing 
investigation and then a sentencing hearing. 
(The Court): And do you understand that the agreement contemplates that you 
would receive a withheld judgment as a result of pleading f,ruilty to 
this charge? 
(The Defendant): Yes, sir. 
(The Court): Do you know what a "withheld judgment" means? 
(The Defendant): Yes. 
(The Court): Why don't you explain to me what you're understanding is? 
(The Defendant): Well, I mean that - I guess, I'd explain that - my understanding of 
the entire agreement is that I that I am pleading guilty to this 
charge and that I will spend my punishment will include 30 days 
in Latah County jail. I will pay a $\,000 fine. And I'm pleading 
guilty to one of the - one of the felony charges. I'll have a year 
probation, and if I fulfill the period of probation without any 
problems in that period of time, that the felony charges would --
would be dropped. 
(The Court): Well, Mr. Guess, the -- I think you understand what a withheld 
judgment means. It means that if you comply with your terms and 
conditions of probation that at the conclusion of the period of 
probation, which is for a period of no more than five years, 
according to the agreement, that you could come in and petition to 
have your guilty plea, which you tendered today, withdrawn and 
the charge against you dismissed. Do you understand that? 
(The Defendant): I do, yes. 
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(App., C, p. 76, L. 21-25, p. 77, L. 1-23 & p. 78, L. 8-16.) Neither the district court nor the State 
rejected or disputed Charles' reasonable understanding. (App., C. 76-78; Tr., p. 63-88.) The 
district court explained some of the reasons why it accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement: 
One of the reasons that I was willing to accept the Rule 11 Agreement, Mr. Guess, 
frankly, is the - as your counselor put it, the numerous charitable acts that you 
have perfonned. It's rare when I see someone who has done as much as you have, 
and for that, you, I think, are getting the benefit of your agreement with the 
State ... I was genuinely impressed by the contributions that you have made to 
society both personally and professionally that is evidenced in the letters that were 
submitted on your behalf. .. 
I also thought that your statement was genuine and heartfelt. I'd also - I think 
recognizes that he is not trying to blame others for what you do. It's important 
that you exhibit that empathy for your victims of this incident. I think you, by 
your statement, you figured that out. 
(App., C, p. 120. L. 20-25, p. 121, L. 1, 6-9, 12-15 & p. 122, L. 12-16.) After reviewing the 
presentence report, the district court accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, ~with()llt qual[flcation: 
Then pursuant to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, I am withholding judgment in this 
case. I am placing Mr. Guess on a period of five years [of] probation under my 
standard terms and conditions ... 
(App., C, p. 85, L. 10-13, p. 109, L. 6-7 & p. 119, L. 9-12.) 
On September 6, 2006, the district court entered the Order Withholding Entry of 
Judgment and Order of Probation ("Order Withholding Judgment"). (App., B, p. 1-8.) Pursuant 
to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, the district court found: "that the interests of justice would be 
best served if entry of judgment were withheld and the defendant placed on probation," imposed 
sentenced Charles to thirty days of incarceration, imposed other terms of sentence and ordered 
the maximum five-years of probation (the State requested the maximum based upon Michele's 
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fear). (App., A-B & C, p. 115, L. 8-17.) For the next five years, Charles faithfully and diligently 
complied with all terms of his sentence and probation, without any problems or violations: 
As of September 1,2011 and through the date that my probation was tem1inated, I 
faithfully and without violation served my sentence and completed my 5 years of 
probation in accordance with the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Order Withholding 
Entry of Judgment and Order of Probation I was also never found to be in 
violation of my probation, despite several unannounced visits by the probation 
officers to my residence. I was under the constant threat that if I violated the terms 
of my probation in any way, then I would be in violation of the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement and I could be subject to significant jail time. I served my 30 days in 
jail. I promptly paid all court costs, fines, and other mandated costs, sometimes 
two months in advance of the due date. Because of my compliance, over time I 
was given certain additional liberties to travel and was eventually placed on 
unsupervised probation. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 247-48, ~9; see also id, p. 248-49, ~~1O-11.) Charles was transferred to 
unsupervised probation on January 27,2011. (Id; R. Vol. II, p. 171-72.) On August 31,2011, the 
tive-year term of probation and No Contact Order expired. (R. Vol. J, p. 69, 103-11.) Prior to and 
after its expiration, Michele never requested a modification or extension of that No Contact 
Order. On September 7,2011, Charles tiled a Motion to Dismiss Withheld Judgment. CR. Vol. II, 
p. 174-75.) Charles testified that he had complied with all terms of probation. (R. Vol. II, p. 176-
177.) Fourteen letters were submitted in support of Charles (R. Vol. II, p. 179-209.), including 
one letter from his Psychologist, who, without compensation, voluntarily stated: 
At no time in our counseling sessions has [Charles] ever expressed wanting to 
harm his ex-wife in any way. Overall, he has left me with the impression that he 
has no desire to have any additional contact with her, except in the context of co-
parenting their son. I do not believe that he currently poses a threat to her, or to 
himself at this time. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 183 & 252, ~19.) The State did not file a Response and no evidence was submitted 
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opposing Charles' Motion. On November 16, 2011, a hearing was held and the district court 
orally denied the Motion 2 (Tr. p. 46, L. 13, p. 57, L. 6-7.) At that hearing, the district court 
found: "I have a defendant who has performed as well as anv defendant 1 can remember 
while on probation." (App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 (emphasis added).) On December 23,2011, the 
Court denied Charles' Motion, but it ruled that he had "successfully completed the period of 
probation ordered by the Court" and discharged him from probation3 (R. Vol. II, p. 212-13.) 
On January 19, 2012, Charles asserted, inter alia.'}', the refusal to set aside his guilty plea, 
dismiss this action and restore his civil rights constitutes separate breaches of his Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement. (R. Vol. IT, p. 218-43.) In Response to that Motion, despite Charles' clear 
reasonable understanding of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement (App., C, p. 76-78; R. Vo!' II, p. 245-
46, ~~4-8), the State asserted: 
The plea agreement in this case, as with vil1ually all other similar agreements, 
does not contain specific language about the withdrawal of the guilty plea and 
ultimate dismissal of the case ... While it is true that the undersigned cannot recall 
any other case where a defendant complied with his probation and did not receive 
Idaho Code 19-3604 [sic] relief. .. the State's intent at the time of the plea was that 
by virtue of the Court withholding judgment, Idaho Code 19-2604 relief would be 
available to Dr. Guess (and, practically, speaking, the State would expect that the 
Court would grant the relief) if Dr. Guess was fully compliant with his probation." 
(R. Vol. II, p. 261-62.) The State never objected or rejected Charles' reasonable understanding 
of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (App., C, p. 76-78; R. Vol. II, p. 245-47, ~~4-8 & p. 260-62A.) 
2 Only Michele appeared telephonically at the hearing and she resides in another state. (See Presentence 
Report.) Contrary to the district COUlt's finding, she did not object to the relief requested or the Motion, but stated "1 
still have some fear. . .1, as a victim, will always be in fear of Mr. Guess." (App., C, p. 55, L. 17-18, 22-23.) 
3 Charles \vas on probation for 114 days longer in violation of Idaho law. See Section IY(D). 
4 The State's Response was signed by William W. Thompson, Jr., and he presented oral argument at the 
two recent hearings. (R. Vol. II, p. 260-264, Tr., p. 6 & 47.) The State was represented by James E. M. Craig for the 
execution and entry of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (App., A-B: Tr., p. 61 & 102.) 
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At the hearing, Judge Stegner found: "I don't think that I've ever seen a showing as positive 
as I saw for Mr. Guess." (App., C, p. 42, L. 9-1 a (emphasis added).) But the district court 
denied Charles relief under I.C § 19-2604(1) based upon Michele's fear, although she never 
objected and failed to present any evidence to support any new allegations of fear5 (Tr., p. 8-43; 
App., C, p. 55, L. 11-24.) Charles and Michele's adult son confirmed that she did not object: 
In my communications with my mother she has had no objection to full 
reinstatement of his civil liberties. 
(R. Vol. IT, p. 181.) However, the district court orally denied Charles' Motion and refused to 
state how or when Charles would ever obtain relief (App., C, p. 38, L. 16-17; R. Vol. IT, p. 242.) 
I think that there will come a time when Mr. Guess's rights will be restored. I 
can't tell you when that time will be, but I think given the showing that I have 
seen, given the contrition that I have seen, given the rehabilitation that I have 
seen, I think Mr. Guess is on the right track as far as having me grant the relief 
that he requests. 






... so that T know T understood you right, did you say earlier that if 
Michele didn't object, then you would grant the relief:> 
I did ... Whether that is possible is anybody's guess. 
So, that's what you're really hinging the -- the compatible with 
public interest is, whether if Michele is -- your concern over 
Michele? 
That's my current reservation. 
Okay. Okay. And -- and just so that Charles knows, is there -- is 
5 Michele was only one of the two victims. TIle State indicated that the other victim had no interest in the 
proceedings: "Mr. Welsh. some time back, advised us when we contacted him that he didn't have any position about 
how - this case ,Yent at any stage. He didn't need to be involved any more." (Tr .• p. 33, L 23-25, p. 34, L 1.) 
Additionally, the district court stated: "I don't think he has [an] objection." (Ii/. at L 19.) 
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(The Court): 
there anything else that he needs to be doing to somehow help the 
process along or just continue to be a law abiding citizen? 
Continue to be a law abiding citizen. Continue to do the things that 
he's done in the time that he's been on probation. As I said, I don't 
think I've ever seen a showing as positive as I saw for Mr. Guess. 
And my hesitancy is based upon the compatibility with the public 
interest, and Michele Guess as a victim of the offense, can-ies no 
small amount of voice in that. 
(App., C, p. 41, L. 15-18,20-21,24-25, p. 42, L. 1-13.) Later that day, Charles filed his Notice of 
Appeal. (R Vol. II, p. 273-77.) On February 6, 2012, the district court explained its ruling: 
The fact that one of the victims in this case still fears the party who is seeking the 
extraordinary relief granted by 1. C. § 19-2604(1) is no small issue for this Court. 
This Court acknowledges that Guess is on the right track to obtaining the relief he 
seeks, which is why this Court indicated that it would be willing to revisit this 
issue in the future. The determination that Guess should be granted relief under 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) is not entirely dependent on Michele's acquiescence. Such 
acquiescence may never occur. Nonetheless, this Court is unwilling to 
disregard her feal' of the Defendant and her objection to him being granted 
relief pursuant to I. C. § 19-2604(1), at this time. Because this Court finds that it 
would not be compatible with the public interest to set aside Guess's plea of 
guilty, dismiss his case, and restore his civil rights, it declines to do so. 
(App., E, p. 6-7.) On March 12,2012, Charles appealed that order as well. (Mot. Aug. R, p. 1-5.) 
C. Identification of Appendixes. 
Charles has attached Appendixes A-E to this Brief. Appendix A ("App., A") is the Rule 
11 Plea Agreement. (R Vol. I, p. 52-54.) Appendix B ("App., B") is the Order Withholding 
Entry of Judgment. (R Vol. I, p. 103-110.) Appendix C ("App., C") are pertinent pages of the 
Transcript. (Tr., p. 1-127.) Appendix D ("App., D") is the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss Withheld Judgment. (R Vol. II, p. 212-213.) Appendix E ("App., E") is the "Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Enforce Rule 11 Plea Agreement. .. " (R Vol. II, p. 280-286.) 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the district court erred by: (1) not interpreting and enforcing the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement in accordance with its plain meaning and (2) by not construing the Rule II 
Plea Agreement against the State and in Charles' favor in accordance with his reasonable 
understanding requiring the State bear the responsibility for any lack of clarity? 
B. Whether Charles' constitutional due process rights were violated when the promise that 
induced him to plead guilty pursuant to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement was not honored? 
C. Whether the district court erred in finding the "compatible with the public interest" 
provision in I.e. § 19-2604(1) was not satisfied based upon Michele's alleged "fear" and 
whether that finding was barred from being re-litigated and was it supported by 
substantial and competent evidence? 
D. Whether the district court had jurisdiction to not dismiss the Order Withholding 
Judgment once Charles complied with the terms and conditions of sentence and probation 
and whether the di strict court's orders further constitute an illegal sentence? 
E. Whether the district court erred by not holding that the Rule 11 Plea Agreement prevailed 
over I.e. § 19-2601(3) and I.e. § 19-2604(1)? 
F. Whether the district court erred by not restoring Charles' civil rights (including the right 
to bear arms) in violation of I.e. § 19-2604(1), the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, federal law 
and his constitutional rights and whether that issue is barred from being re-litigated? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the consideration, such promise 
must be fulfilled. Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of 
law to be viewed by this Court de novo, in accordance with contract law 
standards. In detennining whether the State has breached a plea agreement a court 
must examine the language of the plea agreement, and where the language of that 
plea agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the 
defendant. The burden of proving the existence of a contract and the fact of its 
breach is upon the plaintiff. The determination that a plea agreement is ambiguous 
is a question of law; however, interpretation of an ambiguous tem1 is a question of 
fact. 
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 (citations omitted). 
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Where a defendant claims that his or her right to due process was violated, we 
defer to the trial court's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence. 
However, [the Court] freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles 
to those facts found. It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate facts that 
constitute a due process violation. It is fundamental to our legal system that the 
State shall not deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law." It is a two-step process to determine due process rights: first, 
deciding whether a governmental decision would deprive an individual of a 
libeliy or property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause; and second, if a liberty or propelty interest is implicated, a 
balancing test must be applied to deternline what process is due. "[M]inimum 
procedural due process requirements ultimately tum on a highly fact specific 
inquiry." The reviewing courts analyze the totality of the circumstances. 
State v. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131, 134-35, 244 P.3d 630, 633-34 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations 
omitted). I.e. § 19-2604(1) authorizes a court to set aside a guilty plea if the defendant complies 
with terms of probation. 5'tate v. Gr{tfith, 140 Idaho 616, 617, 97 P.3d 483, 484 (Ct. App. 2004). 
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give 
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. The 
language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If 
the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort 
to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. When this Court must 
engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent 
and give effect to that intent. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only 
must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those 
words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. It is 
incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it 
a nullity. Constructions of statutes that would lead to an absurd result are 
disfavored. 
State v. Dicksen, 152 Idaho 70, 266 P.3d 1175, 1178-79 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). 
"Statutes ... relating to the same subject, should be construed harmoniously, if possible to further 
the legislative intent." State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 828, 230 P.3d 437, 438 (2010) (citations 
omitted). A specific statute governs or controls over a general statute. Ausman v. State, 124 
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Idaho 839, 842, 864 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Ct. App. 1993). Criminal statutes must be construed in 
favor of the defendant. State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 437, 614 P.2d 970, 977 (1980). 
Findings of fact will be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial and competent 
evidence, which is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion. State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592-93, 977 P.2d 203, 206-07 (1999). A district 
court has discretion under I.e. § 19-2604(1) to set aside a defendant's guilty plea and restore his 
civil rights. State v. Hanes, 137 Idaho 40, 41, 44 P.3d 295, 296 (Ct. App. 2002)("Hanes r). 
Issues pertaining to illegal sentences and jurisdiction are questions of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,839,252 P.3d 1255,1257 (2011). 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (I) whether the lower court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Hanes I, 137 Idaho at 41 (citation omitted). 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
The district court erred by not addressing the issues in Sections (A)(2), (B), (C)(2), (D)-
(F). (App., D-E, Tr., p. 36-43 & 49-57.) Moreover, the district court incorrectly perceived the 
issue in Sections (A)-(B) & (C)(l) as ones of discretion, failed to act within the boundaries of the 
discretion exercised for those issues and failed to exercise reason for those issues by basing its 
decisions on Michele's alleged "feae" (ld; Section III.) Finally, the district court erred by not 
interpreting I.e. §§ 19-2604(1) and 19-2601(3): in favor of Charles, hannoniously in accordance 
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with their plain meaning and the legislature's intent, to ensure that the interpretation did not 
render them a nullity, and to ensure the interpretation of them was not an absurd result. (App., D-
E, Tr., p. 36-43 & 49-57; Section III.) For anyone or more of the following reasons, the district 
court erred when it refused to grant Charles relief and the COUli should reverse and remand with 
instructions to set aside his guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore all of his civil rights: 
A. The district court erred in its interpretation of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. 
"A court, as well as the prosecution and defendant, is bound by the agreement once the 
plea agreement is accepted without qualification." State v. Horkley, 125 Idaho 860, 865, 876 
P.2d 142, 147 (1994); Costilow v. State, 318 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex. Ct. App. 20 10)("The role of 
the trial judge is to follow or reject the agreement ... "); Clark v. State, 468 S.E.2d 653, 655 (S.c. 
1996) ("Once a court accepts a plea agreement, it is bound to honor its promise to perform the 
agreement ... "); u.s. v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d 392, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[0 ]nce the court signed 
off on the agreement. .. it became bound by the terms of the agreement"); Us. v. Fernandez, 960 
F.2d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1991) ("the trial court may accept or reject the agreement"); I.c.R. 11 (f) 
"One possible remedy for the breach of a plea agreement is specific perfomlance of the 
terms of that agreement." HOI'kley, 125 Idaho at 865. See also u.s. v. Yellow, 627 F.3d 706, 709 
(8th Cir. 2010) ("to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process and 
undermines the honor of the government, public confidence in the fair administration of justice") 
(citations omitted); Ritsema, 89 F.3d at 402 ("We believe the plea agreement must be 
honored ... "); Margalli-OIvera, 43 F.3d at 351 ("Allowing the govemment to breach a promise 
that induced a guilty plea violates due process."). "To assess whether a plea agreement has been 
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violated, this court considers whether the government's conduct is consistent with the 
defendant's reasonable understanding." u.s. v. Roberts, 624 F.3d 241, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2010). 
"[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so 
that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495,499 (1971). Tn Ritsema, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained the public policy behind honoring plea bargains: 
[O]nce they have given unqualified approval to the plea agreement, they, like the 
parties, become bound by the terms of that agreement. Were courts free to re-
examine the wisdom of plea bargains with the benefit of hindsight, the 
agreements themselves would lack finality and the benefits that encourage the 
government and defendants to enter into pleas might prove illusory ... Once the 
court signed off on the agreement at Ritsema's first sentencing in 1993, it became 
bound by the terms of the agreement ... 
Pleas that bind only the defendant, or even the prosecutor and the 
defendant but not the judge, would be unfair to the defendant and 
would dilute the incentive for defendants to plead at all ... 
Ritsema, 89 F.3d at 401-02 (citation and quotations omitted). 
Here, the district court correctly found that the Rule II Plea Agreement was a valid and 
enforceable contract6 (App., E, p. 3-5.) The district court accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement 
without qual!/ication. (App., A-B & C, p. 119, L. 9-12.) However, the district court erred by: (1) 
incorrectly interpreting the plain meaning of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement; and/or (2) by finding 
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement unambiguous and failing to construe the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in 
favor of Charles based upon his reasonable ullderstanding and requiring the State to bear the 
responsibility for any lack of clarity. (App., E, p. 3-5.) In sum, Charles has not received the 
"I.R.C. II was amended in 2007. Although the Rule II Plea Agreement references "I.C.R. II(d)(l)(C)," 
subsection "(d)" is now subsection "(1)". However, the relevant language remains unchanged. (App., A, p. I.) 
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benefit of the State's promise that induced him to plead guilty. (App., C, p. 76-78.) 
Had I known before I executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement that after 1 completed 
the terms and conditions required under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Order 
Withholding Judgment that I would not have the right to set aside my guilty plea, 
have this action dismissed and have my civil rights restored, I would never had 
executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or pled guilty to any of the charges against 
me. I would have proceeded to trial. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 249, ~12; App., C, p. 76-78.) Simply put, there are no written terms in the Rule 11 
Plea Agreement that support the district court or State's interpretations. (App., A-B, D & E, p. 3-
5; R. Vol. II, p. 260-62A.) Thus, based upon any of the reasons in Sections A(1)-(2) below, the 
district court and State have breached the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and it should be specifically 
enforced to set aside Charles' guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore all of his civil rights7 
1. The district court erred by not enforcing the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in 
accordance with its plain meaning. 
"The meaning of an unambiguous contract must be determined from the plain meaning 
of the contract's own words." State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886,11 P.3d 1101,1104 (2000). A 
court may "[w]ithhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and may 
place the defendant on probation." I.e. § 19-2601(3). See I.e. § 19-2604(1). "To withhold 
judgment after a plea of guilty protects the defendant at that time against the stigma of a 
conviction which may be forever avoided should the defendant conform to its terms and 
conditions" E" parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 479, 253 P2d 794, 797 (1953). As set forth in 
Section TTl above, statutes must be interpreted in favor of the defendant, in accordance with 
7 Although revocation of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and allowing Charles to withdraw his guilty plea and 
proceed to trial are also remedies, they are not appropriate remedies here because he has already complied with five-
year period of probation and other tenns o[sentence. (R. Vol. II, p. 247-49, ~~9-11; App .. D. p. 2 &E. p. 6.) 
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legislative intent and in a manner that prevents absurd results. 
The obvious and commendable objective of the Act which seeks in a proper case 
to avoid the stigma of a judgment of conviction would be in major part defeated if 
the contention of petitioner is accepted. To withhold judgment after a plea of 
guilty protects the defendant at that time against the stigma of a conviction which 
may be forever avoided should the defendant conform to its terms and conditions. 
This creates, and rightfully so, a hope in the heart of the accused that he may 
ultimately be released under an order of probation without the stigma of a 
judgment of conviction. This is an incentive for complete rehabilitation and 
reform, one of the salutary objectives of the Act. 
Medley, 73 Idaho at 479. See State v. Hanes, 139 Idaho 392, 394, 79 P.3d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 
2003) ("Hailes IF') ("we presume that the legislature intended that in order for a defendant to be 
granted relief under I.e. § 19-2604( I), he or she must comply with ... probation ... "). 
Here, the district court erred in its interpretation of the plain meaning of the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement. (App., E, p. 3-5.) The district court's decision was an abuse of discretion because it 
may only "[w]ithhold judgment on such tenns and for such time as it may prescribe and may 
place the defendant on probation." I.e. § 19-2601(3). The Rule 11 Plea Agreement provided: 
That the Defendant shall receive a Withheld Judgment and shall be placed on 
probation to the Idaho State Department of corrections for a peIiod of no more 
than five (5) years ... 
(App., A, p. 2.) As a result, the Order Withholding Judgment was entered, which provided: 
[O]n June 19, 2006, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to such charge which 
plea was accepted by the Court ... the Court finds that the interests of justice would 
be best served if the entry of judgment were withheld and the defendant placed on 
probation to the Idaho State Board of Correction ... FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE 
(5) YEARS COMMENCING ON AUGUST 31,2006 ... 
(App., B, p. 2.) There is not a single term in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement reserving any rights or 
discretion to the district court to extend probation or indefinitely withhold judgment past five 
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years, so long as Charles complies with probation. (App., A-B.) When questioned by the district 
court at the hearing held to accept the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, Charles confinned, without 
objection by any party, the plain meaning: "I'll have a period of probation, and if I fulfill the 
period of probation without any problems in that period of time, that the felony charges 
would -- would be dropped." (App., C, p. 77, L. 20-23.) (emphasis added). Judge Stegner 
agreed with this plain meaning: "I think vou understand what a withheld judgment means." 
(App., C, p. 78, L. 8-9 (emphasis added).). After Charles completed all of the terms of his 
sentence and five-years of probation, the district court found: "I don't think I've ever seen a 
showing as positive as I saw for Mr. Guess." (App., C, p. 42, L. 9-10.) Thus, not only did 
Charles live up to his end of the bargain under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, but he did so better 
than any defendant the district court had seen. When the district court found Charles 
"successfully completed the period of probation" and "fully complied with every court-imposed 
term and condition of his probation" (App., D, p. 2 & E, p. 285), it was required to set aside his 
guilty plea under the plain meaning of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, but it did not and the Rule 11 
Plea Agreement has been breached. Significantly, the State has done nothing to cure that breach. 
When the State's Attorney has given his word in the form of a plea bargain ... it 
behooves the State's Attorney to make every reasonable effort to correct any 
deviation from the bargain when the deviation is called to his attention. 
Clark, 468 S.E.2d at 655. Instead, the State simply asserted it "would expect that the Court 
would grant the relief" (R. Vol. IT, p. 262.) The Rule II Agreement remains in breach. 
Moreover, the district court and State's positions are contrary to the legislature's intent for 
authorizing withheld judgments. (App., E, p. 5; R. VoLlI, p. 261) See I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-
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2604(1); Hanes II, 139 Idaho at 394; 114edley, 73 Idaho at 479. These authorities implicitly hold 
that a court has no discretion to deny a request to set aside a guilty plea upon the defendant's 
compliance with the terms of probation and sentence under a withheld judgment-which is the 
legislature's intent to refonn defendants through I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1). If a district 
court may deny a defendant's request for a withheld judgment if it "has sufficient information to 
determine that a withheld judgment would be inappropriate" (S'fa!e v. Geier, 109 Idaho 963, 965, 
712 P.2d 664,666 (1985», then the district court abused its discretion when it did not set aside 
Charles' guilty plea after he complied with all terms of sentence and probationS (App., D-E.) 
2. The district court erred by not enforcing the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in Charles' 
favor in accordance with his reasonable understanding and by not requiring the 
State to bear the responsibility for the lack of clarity. 
Any ambiguities in a plea agreement must be interpreted 111 favor of the 
defendant. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596; US. v. Jensen, 423 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 2005) (if "a 
plea agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities are construed against the government."). 
Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant. 
"As with other contracts, provisions of plea agreements are occasionally 
ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear the responsibility for any lack 
of clarity." "[AJmbiguities are construed in favor of the defendant. Focusing on 
the defendant'S reasonable understandi11g also reflects the proper constitutional 
focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty." 
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Fernandez, 960 F.2d at 772 
("To determine ... the tenns of the plea agreement, we look to what was reasol1ably understood 
by the defendant when he entered his plea.") (emphasis added); Roberts, 624 F.3d at 245-46 ("To 
R As discussed in SectionIV(D), the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to indefinitely suspend 
the Order Withholding Judgment after Charles complied with the tenns and conditions of sentence and probation. 
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assess whether a plea agreement has been violated, this court considers ... the defendant's 
reasonable understanding.") (emphasis added). 
Here, the district court erred when it found the Rule 11 Plea Agreement unambiguous and 
failed to interpret it in favor of Charles in accordance with his reasonable understanding and by 
not requiring the State to bear the responsibility for any lack of clarity. (App., E, p. 3-5.) 
First, the district cOUli and State both implicitly concede that the Rule 11 Plea Agreement 
was ambiguous based upon the indefiniteness of when his guilty plea would set aside: 
The plea agreement in this case, as with virtually all other similar agreements, 
does not contain specific language about withdrawal of the guilty plea and 
ultimate dismissal of the case. Rather, it uses my office's standard language which 
agrees to the Court withholding judgment, but which does not specify what means 
prospectively as far as Idaho Code 19-3604 [sic] relief. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 261.) The district court asserted: "[t]he agreement does not contain a single term 
regarding the ultimate disposition of this case." (App., E, p. 5.) "[T]he burden is upon the party 
claiming that ambiguity exists to show the necessary indefinite of meaning." 11 Williston on 
Contracts § 30:5 (4th ed.) By the State and district court's own admissions, Charles has met that 
burden. Thus, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is ambiguous because it is vague and indefinite as to 
when Charles' guilty plea would be set aside. As such, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement must be 
construed in Charles' favor and it is "implied by the plea agreement" that his guilty plea would 
be set aside upon completing probation. (App., A; R. Vol. II, p. 262.) 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law § 640 (2012) (courts "will not constme the language so literally that the purpose of the plea 
agreement is frustrated; accordingly, the court considers terms implied by the plea agreement"). 
Second, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement must be enforced in accordance with Charles' 
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reasonable understanding. Petersoll, 148 Idaho at 595-97. Charles' reasonable understanding of 
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement has never been disputed by the State or the district court: 
I was aware that I had the option of having my case decided by [a] jury, but I 
wished to accept responsibility for my actions, pay the price and then be rewarded 
for doing so. I carefully reviewed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement prior to signing it. 
lt was explained to me by my attorney and I understood that ifI complied with all 
of the terms and conditions in that Rule 11 Plea Agreement (including up to five 
years of probation), then I would be permitted to have my guilty plea set aside, 
this action dismissed and my civil rights restored and there would be nothing on 
my previously unblemished record. Based upon my understanding that I would 
receive a withheld judgment and that my guilty plea would be set aside in no 
more than five years ifI complied with all the terms of my sentence and probation 
under the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement (and that no trace of this action 
would be on my record), I agreed to wave my right to a jury trial and pled guilty 
to one of the three charges. 
I cherish my civil rights. Having my civil rights is extremely important to me and 
this is one of the material reasons why I agreed to be bound by the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement. I wanted to be able to once again enjoy all my civil liberties. 1 
understood my obligations under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and pledged to 
comply with those obligations. In return, I had the expectation that if I complied 
with my obligations that I would be pennitted to withdraw my guilty plea, have 
this case dismissed and have my cherished civil rights restored. 
(R. Vo!' II, p. 245-46, ~~4 & 6.) The district court even questioned his understanding: 
(The Court): And my understanding is that you're pleading pursuant to a Rule 11 
Agreement; is that correct? 
(The Defendant): Yes. 
(The Court): 'Vhy don't you explain to me what your understanding is of 
what will happen to you if I accept that plea. 
(The Defendant): Well, my understanding is there will be a pre sentencing 
investigation and then a sentencing hearing. 
(The Court): And do you understand that the agreement contemplates that 
vou would receive a withheld judgment as a result of pleading 
19 
guilty to this charge? 
(The Defendant): Yes. sir. 
(The Court): Do you know what a "withheld judgment" means? 
(The Defendant): Yes. 
(The Court): Why don't you explain to me what you're understanding is? 
(The Defendant): Well, I mean that I guess, I'd explain that - my understanding 
of the entire agreement is that I - that I am pleading guilty to 
this charge and that 1 will spend my punishment will include 30 
days in Latah County jail. I will pay a $1,000 fine. And I'm 
pleading guilty to one of the - one of the felony charges. I'll 
have a year probation, and if I fulfill the period of probation 
without any problems in that period of time, that the felony 
chal'ges would -- would be dropped. 
(The Court): Well, Mr. Guess, the -- I think you understand what a withheld 
judgment means. It means that if vou comply with your terms 
and conditions of probation that at the conclusion of the period 
of probation, which is for a period of no more than five years, 
according to the agreement, that vou could come in and petition 
to have your guilty plea, which you tendered today, withdrawn 
and the charge against you dismissed. Do you understand that? 
(The Defendant): I do, yes. 
(App., C, p. 76, L. 21-25, p. 77, L. 1-23 & p. 78, L. 8-16 (emphasis added).) When Charles 
articulated his reasonable understanding, the district court and State had a duty to advise Charles 
of the positions which they are now taking, but they both failed to do so. (Tr., p. 76-88.) 
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 597. Instead, the district court agreed with his understanding and the 
State accepted his understanding through its silence. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596-97 (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69 (1981 ». Since the State did not object or reject Charles' 
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reasonable understanding (Tr., 76-88), it became a part of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. ld. In 
reality, Charles' undisputed reasonable understanding was also the State's understanding: 
" ... the State would expect that the Court would grant the relief." (R. Vol. II, p. 262.) In sum, 
Charles was induced to plead guilty by a false promise. See Section IV(B). If this Court accepts 
the State and district court's positions as to the ultimate disposition, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement 
would lack finality and be illusory. Ritsema, 89 F .3d at 401 ("the agreements ... would lack 
finality and ... prove illusory"). Notably, the State could not "recall any other case where a 
defendant has complied with his probation and did not receive Idaho Code 19-2604 relief." (R. 
Vol. II, p. 261.) Tfthe district court or State wanted the right to take their present positions, then 
it was incumbent upon the State to include those terms in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or the 
district court to reject it, but they both failed to do so. See 1.c.R. 11(f). Thus, Charles' undisputed 
reasonable understanding of the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is controlling and it 
should be enforced in accordance with his reasonable understanding-which is that his guilty 
plea must be set aside and his civil rights restored now that he has complied with all terms of 
sentence and probation. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 ("Focusing on the defendant's reasonable 
understanding also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant to 
plead guilty."); Roberts, 624 F.3d at 245-46 ("To assess whether a plea agreement has been 
violated, this court considers ... the defendant's reasollable understanding."); Santobel1o, 404 
U.S. at 262 ("[W]hen a plea rests ... on a promise ... such promise must be fulfilled."). 
Third, the State must bear the responsibility for any lack of clarity in the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596-97. Since the distlict court and State both assert that the 
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Rule 11 Plea Agreement does not specifically state when Charles' guilty plea would be set aside 
(R Vol. II, p. 261-62; App., E, p. 5), the State must bear the responsibility for that lack of clarity. 
There are no terms or conditions in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement which expressly state, let alone 
infer, that the district court would retain any discretion for the ultimate disposition of Charles' 
case, so long as he complied with the terms of sentence and probation. (App., A.) It is illogical to 
believe that Charles, let alone any defendant, would agree to plead guilty to a withheld judgment 
that could be suspended indefinitely-during which time he would be considered a convicted 
felon. See Us. v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P.3d 1059 (2008). In fact, I.C. § 19-2604 is not even 
referenced in the Rule Plea Agreement or the Order Withholding Judgment-let alone Michele's 
fear. (App., A-B.) However, the district court based its decision solely on Michele's alleged fear: 
The fact that one of the victims in this case still fears the party who is seeking the 
extraordinary relief granted by T. e. § 19-2604(1) is no small issue for this Court. 
This Court acknowledges that Guess is on the right track to obtaining the relief he 
seeks, which is why this Court indicated that it would be willing to revisit this 
issue in the future. The determination that Guess should be granted relief under 
I.e. § 19-2604(1) is not entirely dependent on Michele's acquiescence. Such 
acquiescence may never occur. Nonetheless, this Court is unwilling to disregard 
her fear of the Defendant and her objection to him being granted relief pursuant to 
I. e. § 19-2604(1), at this time. Because this Court finds that it would not be 
compatible with the public interest to set aside Guess's plea of guilty, dismiss his 
case, and restore his civil rights, it declines to do so. 
(App., D & E, p. 6-7.) Notably, if the district court believed Michele's fear was a basis to deny 
the "extraordinary relief' to Charles, the proper mechanism was to reject the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement-rather than induce him to plead guilty with a false promise. If the State wanted 
language that the district court would retain discretion to deny Charles relief after he faithfully 
completed his sentence and probation, it was incumbent upon it to include those terms. Neither 
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the district court nor the State may now insert new terms in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. The 
district court improperly based its decisions on the new terms pertaining to Michele's alleged 
"fear." Costilow, 318 S.W.3d at 537 ("A trial court exceeds its authority when it inserts 
additional, non-negotiated terms"). Thus, the State "must bear the responsibility for any lack of 
clarity" pertaining to when Charles' guilty plea would be set aside. Peterso11, 148 Idaho at 596. 
The foregoing facts and authorities illustrate why Rule 11 Plea Agreements are 
interpreted in favor of defendants with a focus on their reasonable understanding. Although the 
State included specific terms to address Charles' breaches of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, it did 
not include any terms that support its present position or the district court's decisions. (App., A, 
p. 1-3; R. Vol. II, p. 260-62A.) Under any of the above arguments or the totality of them all, the 
State and district court have breached the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and it should be 
specifically enforced in favor of Charles in accordance with his reasonable understanding with 
the State bearing the responsibility for the lack of clarity. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596-97; 
Roherts, 624 F.3d at 245-46 ("To assess whether a plea agreement has been violated, this court 
considers ... the defendant's reasonable understanding.")' The district cOUlt should be reversed 
with instructions to set aside his guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore all of his civil rights. 
Id; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Barkley, 125 Idaho at 865; I.e. § 19-2604(1); Section IV(F). 
B. Charles' due process rights were violated when the promise that induced him to 
plead guilty was not honored. 
No person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 
Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; U.S. CONST. Amend XIV, § I. 
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It is well established that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise 
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement 
or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. This principal is derived from 
the Due Process Clause and the fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea 
must be both voluntary and intelligent. If the prosecution has breached its promise 
given in a plea agreement, whether that breach was intentional or inadvertent, it 
cannot be said that the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, for the 
defendant has been led to plead guilty on a false promise. In such an event, the 
defendant will be entitled to relief. As a remedy, the court may order specific 
performance of the agreement or may permit the defendant to withdraw the guilty 
plea. 
State v. Stocks, 2012 WL 2053594 *2 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). "Allowing the 
government to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process." Margalli-
Olvera, 43 FJd at 351 (emphasis added); Yellow, 627 F.3d at 709 ("to breach a promise that 
induced a guilty plea violates due process and undermines the honor of the government, public 
confidence in the fair administration of justice") (emphasis added). "Focusing on the defendant's 
reasonable understanding also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the 
defendant to plead guilty." Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 (emphasis added); Roberts, 624 F.3d at 
245-46 ("To assess whether a plea agreement has been violated, this court considers ... the 
defendant's reasonable understanding.") (emphasis added). 
The district court erred and abused its discretion when it refused to enforce the Rule 11 
Plea Agreement focusing on Charles' undisputed reasonable understanding, which was accepted 
by the district court and the State without qualification or objection. (App., A-B, C, p. 76-78, 85, 
119 & E, p. 3-5.) Notably, there are no findings for this Court to review because the district court 
never addressed the due process argument and failed to make any of the required findings of fact. 
(App., E; Tr., 8-43.) See Jacobson, 150 Idaho at 134-35. Likewise, the State conceded the due 
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process arguments by failing to even respond. (R. Vol. II, p. 260-62A.) Charles' due process 
rights have been violated by being induced to plead guilty based upon a promise that has not 
been fulfilled-the promise to set aside his guilty plea and restore his civil rights upon his 
completion of probation as set forth in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and as reasonably 
understood by him. (App., A-B & C, p. 76-78; R. Vol. II, p. 247-50, ~~9-14; Section IV(A)(2).) 
He is being deprived of life and liberty, including the restoration of all of his civil rights. (ld; 
Section IV(F).) Neither the State nor the district court has disputed Charles' reasonable 
understanding regarding the promise that induced him to plead guilty and waive his rights: 
I was aware that I had the option of having my case decided by [a] jury, but r 
wished to accept responsibility for my actions, pay the price and then be rewarded 
for doing so. I carefully reviewed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement prior to signing it. 
It was explained to me by my attorney and I understood that if I complied with all 
of the terms and conditions in that Rule 11 Plea Agreement (including up to five 
years of probation), then I would be permitted to have my guilty plea set aside, 
this action dismissed and my civil rights restored, and there would be nothing on 
my previously unblemished criminal record. Based upon my understanding that I 
would receive a withheld judgment and that my guilty plea would be set aside in 
no more than five years if I complied with all the terms of my sentence and 
probation under the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement (and that no trace of this 
action would be on my record), I agreed to wave my right to a jury trial and pled 
guilty to one of the three charges. 
I cherish my civil rights. Having my civil rights is extremely important to me and 
this is one of the material reasons why I agreed to be bound by the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement. I wanted to be able to once again enjoy all my civil liberties. I 
understood my obligations under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and pledged to 
comply with those obligations. In return, I had the expectation that if I complied 
with my obligations that I would be permitted to withdraw my guilty plea, have 
this case dismissed and have my cherished civil rights restored. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 246, ~~4 & 6.) Prior to accepting the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, the district court 
confirmed Charles' reasonable understanding of the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement: 
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(The Court): And my understanding is that you're pleading pursuant to a Rule 11 
Agreement; is that correct? 
(The Defendant): Yes. 
(The Court): Why don't you explain to me what your understanding is of what 
will happen to you ifI accept that plea. 
(The Defendant): Well, my understanding is there will be a pre sentencing 
investigation and then a sentencing hearing. 
(The Court): And do you understand that the agreement contemplates that you 
would receive a withheld judgment as a result of pleading !:,'Uilty to 
this charge? 
(The Defendant): Yes, sir. 
(The Court): Do you know what a "withheld judgment" means? 
(The Defendant): Yes. 
(The Court): Why don't you explain to me what you're understanding is? 
(The Defendant): Well, I mean that - I guess, I'd explain that - my understanding of 
the entire agreement is that I - that I am pleading guilty to this 
charge and that I will spend - my punishment will include 30 days 
in Latah County jail. I will pay a $1,000 fine. And I'm pleading 
guilty to one of the - one of the felony charges. I'll have a year 
probation, and if I fulfill the period of probation without any 
problems in that period of time, that the felony charges would --
would be dropped. 
(The Court): Well, Mr. Guess, the -- I think you understand what a withheld 
judgment means. It means that if you comply with your terms and 
conditions of probation that at the conclusion of the period of 
probation, which is for a period of no more than five years, 
according to the agreement, that you could come in and petition to 
have your guilty plea, which you tendered today, withdrawn and 
the charge against you dismissed. Do you understand that? 
(The Defendant): I do, yes. 
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(App., C, p. 76, L. 21-25, p. 77, L. 1-23 & p. 78, L. 8-16.) Neither the State nor the district court 
ever disputed Charles' testimony regarding his reasonable understanding of the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement-and the district court agreed with Charles. (App., C, p 76-78; R. Vol. II, p. 260-
62A.) Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596. Instead, they both now offer their own interpretations of the 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement-neither of which considered Charles' undisputed reasonable 
understanding or the written tenns of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (fd; App., A, p. 1-3.) Thus, 
Charles' guilty plea rested on a false promise, and, therefore, was not knowing and voluntary.? 
Stocks, *2. Under the totality of circumstances, he has been deprived of life and liberty under the 
Due Process Clause. Jacobson, 150 Idaho at 134-35; ld. Obviously, Charles would not have pled 
guilty ifhe had known that the promise that induced him to plead guilty would not be honored: 
Had I known before I executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement that after I completed 
the tenns and conditions required under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Order 
Withholding Judgment that I would not have the right to set aside my guilty plea, 
have this action dismissed and have my civil rights restored, I would never had 
executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or pled guilty to any of the charges against 
me. I would have proceeded to trial. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 249, ~12.) 
The State and district court have breached the promises that they made to Charles to 
induce him to plead guilty. (App., A-B & C, p. 76-78; Sections IV(A)(2) & (F).) Although the 
determination of whether the breaches were intentional or inadvertent is irrelevant, the State 
clearly breached is duty of good faith and fair dealing to ensure that Charles' reasonable 
understanding was honored. 5/ee US. v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The plea 
9 Notably, until Charles' guilty plea is set aside. he is considered a convicted felon. Sharp. 145 Idaho 403. 
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agreement ... includes an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing"). Because Charles has 
completed his sentence and probation, specific performance of his reasonable understanding of 
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is the only appropriate remedy. HOI'k!ey, 125 Idaho at 865; 
San/obello, 404 U.S. at 262. Accordingly, the Court should rectify the violation of Charles' due 
process lights by reversing the district court with instructions to set aside his guilty plea, dismiss 
this action and restore all of his civil rights. I.e. § 19-2604( 1); Section IV(F). (App., A-B & E.) 
C. The district court erred when it found that it was not "compatible with the public 
interest" to set aside Charles' guilty plea under I.C. § 19-2604(1). 
"The purpose of an order withholding judgment, as an alternative to a conviction, is to 
allow the defendant an opportunity to rehabilitate himself and thereby avoid the burden of a 
criminal record." State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825, 828, 172 P.3d 1100, 1103 (2007) 
(ahrogated on other ground,'); Medley, 73 Idaho at 479. See I.C § 19-2604(1). A district court 
has authority to withhold judgment and set aside the guilty plea: 
... if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for continuing 
the peliod of probation, and if it be compatible with public interest, terminate 
sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally 
dismiss the case and discharge the defendant...[which] shall have the effect of 
restoring the defendant to his civil rights. 
I.C § 19-2604(1). On September 1, 2011, Charles completed his five-year period of probation 
and as of that date he had complied with every term and condition of sentence and probation 
imposed upon him. (R Vo!' II, p. 176, ,-r,-r2-4 & p. 247-49, ,-r,-r9 & 11.) On December 23, 2011, 
the district court entered an order discharging Charles from probation.]() (App., D, p. 2.) The 
10 Charles was on probation for atieast 114 days longer than authorized under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement 
and in violation ofIdaho law. (App., A. p. 2 & B, p. 2; Section IV(D).) See I.e. § 18-906; I.e. § 19-2601(7). 
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district court found: that "there have been no adjudicated probations violations" that it was 
"convinced that there is no longer cause for continuing probation," that Charles "has fully 
complied with every court-imposed term and condition of his probation," and that "I have a 
defendant who has performed as well as any defendant I can remember while on probation." 
(App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 & E, p. 6.) Despite these findings and the legislature's intent for 
withheld judgments, the district court erred by finding that it was not "compatible with the public 
interest" to grant relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1)11 (App., C, p. 56-57, D, p. 2 & E, p. 5-7.) 
1. The district court erred when it held that Michele's alleged "fear" was a basis to 
find that it was not "compatible with the public interest" under I.e. § 19-2604(1). 
First, the district court erred because it must have implicitly found it to be "compatible 
with the public interest" when it accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and entered the resulting 
Order Withholding Judgment. (App. D-E.) In fact, the district court made the express finding that 
"the interests of justice would be best served if the entry of judgment were withheld and the 
defendant placed on probation to the Idaho State Board of Correction." (App., B, p. 2.) Although 
the district court later backed away from that finding (Tr., p. 36-37), Charles asserts that it could 
not have accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or entered the Order Withholding Judgment if it 
was not "compatible with the public interest." Notably, if Charles had violated any terms of 
probation or any other term of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or Order Withholding Judgment, the 
court could have re-visited "compatible with the public interest." (App., A, p. 3 & B, p. 2-8.) In 
sum, there must be something more than a victim's "fear" to support denying relief to Charles 
11 Interestingly, Judge Stegner was also the district court judge in Hanes 1, 137 Idaho 440. Hanes 11, 139 
Idaho 392 and Stale v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 959 P.2d 465 (el. App. 1998). 
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under I.e. § 19-2604(1 )-assuming that Michele's alleged "fear" was a basis to deny relief under 
I.e. §19-2604(1)-"fear" well known to the district cOUli when it accepted the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement. (App., A & C, p. 109, L. 5-7; Tr. p. 107-08.) If the district court or the State was 
concerned about Michele's ongoing alleged "fear" or whether that alleged "fear" would be a 
basis to deny Charles relief, the State should have included specific tenns in the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement addressing the issue or the district court should have rejected the plea as provided 
under I.e.R. 11(f), but no such terms were included and the district court accepted the Rule 11 
Plea Agreement withollt qualification. Since Charles complied with probation and better than 
"any defendant [the district court could] remember while on probation" (App., C, p. 56, L. 20-
21), the plain and rationale meaning of I.e. § 19-2604(1), interpreted to not render an absurd 
result, dictates that the district cOUli had no discretion to deny relief. Medley, 73 Idaho at 479 
("To withhold judgment. .. protects the defendant at that time against the stigma of a conviction 
which may be forever avoided should the defendant conform to its terms and conditions."). 
Second, the district court misapplied the law when it determined that a victim's "fear" 
supported a finding that it was not "compatible with the public interest." (App., D, p. 2 & E, p. 5-
7.) Although never squarely addressed by this Court, the meaning of "compatible with the public 
interest" can be ascertained from other authorities. See Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance, 
81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("traffic, parking, safety, noise and nuisance 
problems; these clearly represent concerns ... of the public interest. .. "); Slate v. Wagenius, 99 
Idaho 273,286,581 P.2d 319 (1978) (Bistline, J. dissenting) C ... the successful 
completion ... [of] probation ... should result in ... being 'compatible with the public interest'''); 
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State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876, 878-29 (Utah 1975). "Public interest" means: 
The general welfare of the public that warrants recognition and 
protection ... Something in which the public as a whole has a stake; esp., an 
interest that justifies governmental regulation. 
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1350 (9th ed. 2004). In Slale v. Wagenilfs, the dissent addressed 
"compatible with public the interest" (although it was not at issue): 
Clearly, the successful completion of two years of a three year probation period, 
during which she was subject to the constant threat of 30 days' incarceration in 
the Kootenai County jail, together with some bona fide effort at restitution, should 
result in a dismissal and discharge as being "compatible with the public interest." 
Wagenills, 99 Idaho at 286 (Bistline, J. dissenting). In ,')'tate v. ('hambers, the Utah Supreme 
Court squarely addressed the meaning of "if it be compatible with the public interest." 
In the exercise of these broad discretionary powers, which are clearly allowed to 
encourage reformation of wrongdoers, the court must consider a great many 
intangibles, such as the character and personality traits of the defendant, his 
attitude, his prior record, his performance under probation, and whether he has 
acquitted himself well in accepting the duties his society requires. If this 
discretion is reasonably used, and is not shown to have been abused, arbitrary, or 
capricious, the judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed. 
Chambers, 533 P.2d at 879 (foot notes omitted). 
Here, Charles complied with all conditions of his five-year period of probation, served 
thirty days in jail, paid all restitution, completed community service, paid all fines and had no 
violations during several customary unannounced visits by probation officers to his home. (R. 
Vo!' II, p. 247-49, ~~9 & 11.) He was given additional travel liberties and placed on 
unsupervised probation based upon his performance. (fd; R. Vo!' II, p. 171-72.) The district court 
found: "Mr. Guess is clearly contrite ... remorseful...[and) has done all that he can do in 
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order to be awarded relief." (App., C, p. 39, L. 9-11.) Charles' Psychologist, without 
compensation, stated: "At no time in our counseling sessions has he ever expressed wanting to 
hann his ex-wife in any way ... .I do not believe that he currently poses a threat to her." (R. Vol. 





... so that I know I understood you right, did you say earlier that 
if Michele didn't object, then you would grant the relief? 
I did ... Whether that is possible is anybody's guess. 
So, that's what you're really hinging the -- the compatible with 
public interest is, whether if Michele is -- your concern over 
Michele? 
That's my current reservation. 
(App., C, p. 41, L. 15-21, 24-25, p. 42, L. 1-2 (emphasis added).) Neither "fear" nor "victim" are 
words in I.C. §§19-2601(3) or 19-2604(1). Likewise, there are no words or language that a 
victim has a right to object or consent to relief under I. C. § 19-2604( 1). Hailes II, 139 Idaho at 
394 ("The statute does not contain the word 'willfully"'); Manners v. Bd. of Veteril1aJY Med., 
107 Idaho 950,952,694 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1985) ("Nowhere in that statute is there language ... "). 
This Court should decline to adopt any form of Michele's "fear" as being a basis for detennining 
"compatible with the public interest" because it would empower the Judge and the victim with 
unlimited discretion, which would be contrary to the legislature's intent to reform. (App., C, p. 
41, L. 15-18,20-21,24-25, p. 42, L. 1-13.) Medley, 73 Idaho at 479; Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 
828. Other than Michele's statement at the first hearing (which was not an objection), no 
evidence was submitting opposing or objecting to granting Charles relief. (App., C, p. 55, L. 6-
32 
24; Tr., p. 8-43 & 49-57.) The district court found: "Mr. Guess is clearlv contrite. He's 
I"emorseful. He has done all that he can do in order to be awarded the relief that he seeks 
today," that "there have been no adjudicated probations violations," it was "convinced that there 
is no longer cause for continuing probation," Charles "has fully complied with every court-
imposed tern1 and condition of his probation," and "I have a defendant who has performed as 
well as any defendant I can remembel" while on probation." (App., C, p. 39, L. 9-11, p. 56, L. 
20-21 & E, p. 6 (emphasis added).) See Chambers, 533 P.2d at 879. Finally, there is no evidence 
that he poses a risk to anyone, including Michele (who has not resided in Idaho for over seven 
years) and fourteen letters were submitted in support of him. (R. Vol. II, p. 179-209.) Notably, 
Charles had no prior criminal record and the State conceded that it "cannot recall any other case 
where a defendant complied with his probation and did not receive Idaho Code 19-2604 relief." 
(R. Vol. II, p. 245, ~3, p. 261.) Instead, the only finding supported by the record was that it was 
"compatible with public interest" to grant Charles relief. 12 The district court misapplied the law, 
abused its discretion and did not exercise reason when it found that it was not "compatible with 
the public interest" to grant him relief based upon Michele's alleged "fear." (App., D-E.) I.e. § 
19-2604(1); Wagenius, 99 Idaho at 286; Chambers, 533 P.2d at 879; Hanes II, 139 Idaho at 394. 
2. Michele's "fear" may not be re-litigated and the district court's finding that it was 
"not compatible with the public interest" was not supported by any evidence. 
Findings of fact must be supported by substantial and competent evidence, which is 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
12 With all due respect to the district court and Michele, if the standard for obtaining relief is whether the 
victim consents or still has fear of the defendant guilty pleas would neyer be set aside becanse no victim would 
likely eyer consent-which is precisely why I.e. § 19-260..J.( 1) does not contain the words "victim" or "fear." 
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Byington, 132 Idaho at 592-593. 
The district court erred by denying Charles relief based upon Michele's "fear" as being 
not "compatible with the public interest." (App., D & E, p. 5-7; Tr., p. 37-43,49-57.) There was 
no evidence to support a finding of "fear" or any other basis to deny relief. I.e. § 19-2604(1). 
First, the district court and State are collaterally estopped from re-litigating Michele's 
"fear"-the same "fear" present at the time the Rule 11 Plea Agreement was accepted-which 
involves the same parties, the identical issue of "fear" that was previously litigated, the issue of 
"fear" was fairly litigated and the Order Withholding Judgment was entered. (App., B.) See State 
v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707,708,819 P.2d 561, 562 (1991); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 198 
(2011). Michele's "fear" is what resulted in Charles being sentenced to five years of probation: 
However, given the seriousness of the crime, and the fear that Ms. Guess fears -
or has for Mr. Guess, T ask that you impose the full five years' probation to 
protect and give Ms. Guess a feeling of safety, at least in that five years of 
probation. 
(App., A, p. 2 & C, p. 115, L. 10-14.) Neither the State nor the district court had reserved the 
right to use Michele's "fear" as a basis to deny relief to Charles after he completed probation and 
there were no such temls in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (Tr., p. 63-88 & 104-126; App., A.) 
The State conceded that it could not "recall any other case where a defendant complied with his 
probation and did not receive Idaho Code 19-2604 relief' and that "practically speaking, the 
State would expect that the COUIt would grant the relief." (R. Vol. II, p. 261-262.) Ifher alleged 
fear was such an important issue to the district court or the State, they both should have rejected 
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. See I.e.R. I 1 (f). Once the district court found that "there have been 
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no adjudicated probations violations," that it was "convinced that there is no longer canse for 
continuing probation," that Charles "has fully complied with every court-imposed term and 
condition of his probation," and that "I have a defendant who has performed as well as any 
defendant I can remember while on probation," it confimled that there was no basis to find any 
new "fear." (App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 & E, p. 6 (emphasis added).) Assuming that "fear" was an 
element of I.e. § 19-2604(1), absent evidence that Charles has done something new, the district 
court's discretion is "shown to have been abused, arbitrary, [and] capricious." Chambers, 533 
P.2d at 879. The time to use Michele's "fear" as a basis to deny relief has long passed and may 
not be re-litigated. (App., D-E; Tr. 8-43,49-57; Section IV(D).) See Powell, 120 Idaho at 708. 
Second, although the district erred when it never addressed "compatible with the public 
interest" in Charles' first Motion (App., D; Tr., p. 49-57), it also erred when it found that it was 
not "compatible with the public interest" in his second Motion. (App., E, p. 5-7.) 
The fact that one of the victims in this case still fears the party who is seeking the 
extraordinary relief granted by I. e. § 19-2604(1) is no small issue for this Court. 
This Court acknowledges that Guess is on the right track to obtaining the relief he 
seeks, which is why this Court indicated that it would be willing to revisit this 
issue in the future. The determination that Guess should be granted relief under 
I.e. § 19-2604(1) is not entirely dependent on Michele's acquiescence. Such 
acquiescence may never occur. Nonetheless, this Court is unwilling to disregard 
her fear of the Defendant and her objection to him being granted relief pursuant to 
I. e. § 19-2604(1), at this time. Because this Court finds that it would not be 
compatible with the public interest to set aside Guess's plea of guilty, dismiss his 
case, and restore his civil rights, it declines to do so. 
(App., E, p. 6-7; see also App., C, p. 38-42.) The foregoing findings were not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. A victim's "fear" is not a basis to deny relief and "fear" is 
not a word in I.e. § 19-2604(1). Hanes 11, 139 Idaho at 394 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The statute does 
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not contain the word 'willfully'''); lvfanners, 107 Idaho at 952 ("Nowhere in that statute is there 
language ... "). Thus, the district court erred by misapplying the law. Assuming that a victim's 
"fear" was relevant, the proof of objective "fear" required to prove "self.-defense" is instructive. 
The appellant's fear alone is not a legally sufficient reason upon which to base an 
inference that appellant acted in self-defense. Accompanied by the appellant's 
perception of the situation, there must be in addition to circumstances sufficient to 
excite the fears of a reasonable man. Thus an objective and not a subjective 
criterion must be applied when inquiring into appellant's state of mind. 
State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286,291,460 P.2d 711, 716 (1969) (citation omitted). Here, there is 
simply no evidence to support Michele's alleged fear. There is no objective evidence or 
allegations of any act or omission by Charles over the past five years that would support an 
o~jective finding of "fear."l3 Charles never violated the No Contact Order. (R. Vol. I, p. 64; 
App., B & E, p. 6.) The No Contact Order expired on August 31,2011, and Charles has not made 
any "contact" with Michele since that time.!4 Notably, Michele never sought to modify the No 
Contact Order to extend it based upon her alleged "fear." See I.C.R 46.2(b) ("A victim of a 
criminal offense for which a no contact order has issued may request modification ... of that order 
by filing a written request ... "). Michele's failure to seek an extension indicates that she is not 
afraid. Certainly, if she truly feared Charles, she would have at least requested an extension to 
the No Contact Order as provided under I.C.R 46.2(b). Indeed, Charles' and Michele's adult son 
advised the district court that "[i]n my communications with my mother she has had no objection 
to full reinstatement of his civil liberties." (R. Vo!' n, p. 181.) Michele was provided a copy of 
13 If Charles had acted to renew Michele's fear (i.e., stalking, making contact, etc.), he would have violated 
probation and/or the No Contact Order and no relief would have been available to him. (App., A p. 3.) 
14 In fact. Charles' Psychologist stated that Charles "left [himJ with the impression that he has no desire to 
have any additional contact with her, except in the context of co-parenting their son." (R. Vol. II, p. 183.) 
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her son's letter and she never disputed his statements. (R. Vol. II, p. 262A.) In addition, shortly 
after the charges were filed in 2006, Michele and Charles were left alone during the divorce 
proceedings and "[t]here were times in which Michele and Charles laughed.,,15 (R. Vol. II, p. 
258, ~~4-5.) Charles' Psychologist stated that Charles has never "expressed wanting to harm his 
ex-wife in any way" and that he did "not believe that he currently poses a threat to her." (R. Vol. 
II, p. 183.) Despite these facts, Michele never disputed any of them: "I still have some fear" and 
"I, as a victim, will always be in fear." (App., C, p. 55, L. 17-18,22-23.) Michele never appeared 
in any manner at the second hearing, although the State provided her with copies of the filings. 
(Tr., p. 8-43; R. Vol. IT, p. 262A.) In fact, Michele did not fOimally object at either hearing, 
despite the district court's finding that she did. (Tr., p. 8-43 & 49-57.) Lastly, the district court's 
finding that: "I have a defendant who has performed as well as any defendant 1 can 
remember while on probation" does not support the finding of fear or that it is not "compatible 
with the public interest" to grant Charles relief. (App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 (emphasis added).) 
Therefore, there are no facts or evidence that supports an objective finding of fear-let 
alone any finding of fear. In fact, there was no evidence to support the district court's findings. 
(App., D & E, p. 6-7.) I.e. § 19-2604(1). The district court's finding of "fear" may have been, at 
most, a basis to extend the No Contact Order, but Michele never requested an extension. See 
I.e.R. 46.2(b). However, no reasonable mind would accept as adequate the above facts to 
support an o~jective or subjective finding of "fear" to support the conclusion that it was not 
15 The No Contact Order did not apply to the divorce legal proceedings. (App .. C, p. 120, L. 14.) 
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"compatible with public interest" to grant Charles relief under I.C § 19-2604(1 ).16 Byillgton, 132 
Idaho at 592-593; Griffith, 140 Idaho at 484 (the statute "authorizes a trial court to set aside the 
plea of guilty ... if judgment has been withheld and ... the defendant makes a satisfactory showing 
that he has complied with the terms ... [of] probation."). The district court should be reversed with 
instructions to enter an order finding that it is "compatible with the public interest" to set aside 
Charles' guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore his civil rights. I.C § 19-2604(1). 
D. The district court had no jurisdiction to indefinitely withhold judgment and its 
actions constitute an illegal sentence. 
A court may "[w ]ithhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe 
and may place the defendant on probation." I.C § 19-2601(3). 
The court has power in the exercise of its discretion to withhold judgment for a 
reasonable time for any purpose and, where this is done, jurisdiction is retained 
during the period of probation; on the other hand, the power of the court to 
indefinitely suspend the pronouncement of sentence or the withholding of 
judgment is denied ... 
Medley, 73 Idaho at 483-84. "[A] trial COUlt's power to withhold judgment in any given case is 
not unlimited and may properly be constrained within the confines of the enabling statute." 5;tate 
V. Branson, 128 Idaho 790,791,919 P.2d 319, 320 (1996). "The court may correct an illegal 
sentence at any time." I.CR. 35. For aggravated assault, the maximum sentence is five years of 
imprisonment or five years of probation. I.C § 18-906; I.C § 19-2601(7). 
First, the district court erred when it refused to set aside Charles' guilty plea because it 
had no jurisdiction to indefinitely suspend the Order Withholding Judgment. (App., B, D-E.) 
16 I.e. § 19-260-'1(1) was amended after Charles pled guilty. The changes are irrelevant, howeyer, because 
Charles complied with all tenns of probation and meets the criteria under both version one. § 19-260-'l( 1). 
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Once Charles complied with all terms and conditions of sentence and probation imposed upon 
him in the Order Withholding Judgment, the district court had no jurisdiction or authorization to 
unilaterally and indefinitely extend that Order Withholding Judgment or to essentially extend 
probation under I.C. § 19-2601(3). (App., D-E.) Once the court found that it was "convinced 
that there is no longer cause of continuing probation" and that Charles "has done all that he 
can do in order to be awarded the relief he seeks today after completing probation, the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied relief to him and it had no authority to indefinitely 
suspend the Order Withholding Judgment under I.e. § 19-2604(1). (App., C, p. 39, L. 10-11 & 
E, p. 6 (emphasis added).). Medley, 73 Idaho at 483-84; Bransoll, 128 Idaho 790,791; I.e. § 19-
2601(3); I.e. § 19-1604(1). When Charles' counsel requested clarification as to when he could 
expect relief, the district stated: "I can't tell you when that time will be" thereby confinning 
the indefinite period of suspension of the Order Withholding Judgment. Id (App., B & C, p. 38, 
L. 19-20 & D-E.) Thus, the two orders indefinitely withholding judgment should be reversed are 
void. [ute, 150 Idaho at 840 ("orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void"). 
Second, the district court's decisions indefinitely withholding judgment and requiring 
Charles to do the same things while on probation constitutes an illegal sentence. (App., D-E.) 
(Mr. Bond): 
(The Court): 
Okay. Okay. And -- and just so that Charles knows, is there -- is 
there anything else that he needs to be doing to somehow help the 
process along or just continue to be a law abiding citizen? 
Continue to be a law abiding citizen. Continue to do the things 
that he's done in the time that he's been on probation. As I 
said, I don't think I've ever seen a showing as positive as I saw for 
Mr. Guess. 
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(App., C, p. 42, L. 3-10 (emphasis added).) Significantly, Charles was on probation for 114 days 
longer than authorized under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Idaho law. (App., A, p. 2, & D, p. 
2.) r.e.R. 35; I.e. § 18-906; I.e. § 19-2601(7). Thus, the additional 114 days of probation and 
the district court's decision requiring Charles to indefinitely "continue to do the things that he's 
done in the time that he's been on probation" constitute illegal sentences. ld. The Court should 
correct those illegal sentences by reversing with instructions to set aside Charles' guilty plea, 
terminate his probation and restore his civil rights mille pro tllnc to September 1, 2011. 
E. The Rule 11 Plea Agreement prevails over I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1). 
"[W]here conflict exists between statutory criminal provisions and the Idaho Criminal 
Rules in matters of procedure, the rules will prevail." 5/tate v. Curringtoll, 108 Idaho 539, 541, 
700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985). See I.C.R. 11(f); I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1) 
The district court erred when it did not find that the Rule 11 Plea Agreement prevailed 
over I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1). (App., E.) Charles complied with the required terms of 
probation and sentence set forth in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (App., A; R. Vol. II, p. 247-49, 
~~9 & 11.) I.e.R. II(f). Based upon one or more of the arguments in Sections IV(A)-(B), CD) & 
(F), the only issue is the procedural step of setting aside his guilty plea, dismissing this action, 
and restoring his civil rights. There are no tern1S of that Rule 11 Plea Agreement indicating 
otherwise and Charles' reasonable understanding governs the interpretation of that Agreement. 
(App., A; Sections IV(A)-(B) & (F).) Petersoll, 148 Idaho at 596. Once the Court accepted the 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, entered the resulting Order Withholding Judgment and Charles 
complied willi the required sentence and probation, the remaining issue is purely the procedural 
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step of setting aside his guilty plea and restoring his civil rights. I.C. § 19-2604(1). It is implicit 
thatthe Rule 11 Plea Agreement was authorized by I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1). Thus, the 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Charles' reasonable understanding of that Agreement prevail over 
I.C §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1). Currington, 108 Idaho at 541. Section IV(A)(2). 
F. The district court's refusal to restore Charles' civil rights violates Idaho law, the 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, federal law and his constitutional rights. 
"The purpose of an order withholding judgment, as an alternative to a conviction, is to 
allow the defendant an opportunity to rehabilitate himself and thereby avoid the burden of a 
criminal record." Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828. "The final dismissal of the case as herein 
provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant with his civil rights." I.e. § 19-2604(1). 
There are no limits or conditions on the rights which a defendant regains. Manners, 107 Idaho at 
952. "[W]here a judgment has been vacated, it is a nullity, and the effect is as ifit had never been 
rendered at all." State v. Barwick, 94 Idaho 139, 143,483 P.2d 670,674 (1971). A conviction for 
which a person has had his civil rights restored under the law of the convicting jurisdiction is not 
considered a conviction for the purposes of federal law. 18 U.S.e. § 921(1)(20). Idaho law does 
not expressly limit or deny the restoration of the right to possess, ship, receive or transport 
firearms when a guilty plea has been set aside. I.e. § 18-310(2). 
Here, the district court erred when it refused to set aside Charles' guilty plea and restore 
all of his civil rights, including his right to possess firearms P (App., D-E.) The district court's 
decisions and the State's arguments fail for three separate reasons. (Jd; R. Vol. II, p. 262.) 
17 Charles is an avid hunter and outdoors man and he cherishes his civil rights. which was a key inducement 
to him pleading guilty pursuant [0 the Rule II Plea Agreement. (R. Vol. II. p. 19-1 & p. 2-l5-+6, ~~4 & 6.) 
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First, under Idaho law, there are no limitations regarding the civil rights that are restored 
to a defendant after a guilty plea is set aside. I.e. § 19-2604(1); Manners, 107 Idaho at 952 
("Nowhere in that statute is there language which limits or conditions the rights which a 
defendant regains."). In fact, I.e. § 19-2604(1) specificalIy calIs for the restoration of alI civil 
rights and it must be construed in favor of Charles. The legislature's intent was to reform 
defendants and allow them to avoid any burdens of a criminal record, including the restoration of 
the right to possess firearms. Since Charles has complied with alI conditions imposed upon him, 
his guilty plea should be set aside, this action dismissed and all of this civil rights restored. Id 
Any other interpretation of I.e. § 19-2604( I) would result in improperly construing that statute 
against Charles and would further constitute an interpretation contrary to the legislature's intent, 
an absurd result and violate the plain and rationale meaning of I.e. § 19-2604(1). See Section Ill. 
Second, under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, the State did not include any terms or 
conditions limiting which civil rights would be restored or that the right to bear firearms would 
be subject to any limitations, including I.e. § 18-310. (App., A.) Charles was induced to plead 
guilty pursuant to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement with the reasonable understanding that all of his 
civil rights would be restored. 
Had I known before I executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement that after I completed 
the terms and conditions required under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Order 
Withholding Judgment that I would not have the right to set aside my guilty plea, 
have this action dismissed and have my civil rights restored, I would never had 
executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or pled guilty to any of the charges against 
me. I would have proceeded to trial. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 249, ~12; App., C, p. 76-78.) While the State did not object or respond to the 
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restoration of Charles' civil rights in his first motion (R Vol. II, p. 174; Tr., 49-57), at the next 
hearing the State asserted that Charles' civil rights have been restored, "with the exception of his 
right to possess firearms (for which he will need to petition the Parole Commission at a future 
date)." (R. Vol. II, p. 262.) Nevertheless, it does not dispute or address Charles' reasonable 
understanding that all of his rights would be restored. (R. Vol. II, p. 260-62A.) The State is 
attempting to impermissibly insert new terms in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in violation of due 
process. (Id; App., A.) See Costilow, 318 S.W.3d at 537; U.S. CON ST. Amend XIV, § 1; Idaho 
Const. art. 1, § 13. The State previously addressed firearms requesting that the district court 
"impose as a specific term of probation, again, to help alleviate some of Ms. Guess's fears that 
Mr. Guess not be allowed to possess any firearms." (App., C, p. 115, L. 15-17.) The State did not 
take its current position at that hearing. (Id; R Vol. 11, p. 262.) The State did not include any 
terms that limited or barred Charles' right to possess firearms in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. 
(App., A; Tr., 63-88 & 104-126.) Likewise, the district court could have rejected the plea over 
any concern about the restoration of the right to possess fireanns, but it failed to do so. (App., A-
B.) l.C.R 11(f). At a minimum, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is vague and ambiguous since it 
does not specifically address firearms and it must be construed in favor of Charles based upon 
his reasonable understanding-which is the proper constitutional focus since the restoration of 
his rights was part of the inducement for him to plead guilty. (App., A & C, p. 76-78, R. Vol. II, 
p. 245-46, ~4; Sections VI(A)-(B).) Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596. Tn addition, the same arguments 
and authorities in Sections IV(A)-(B) apply here to the restoration of Charles' civil rights. The 
State must bear the responsibility for any lack of clarity. Id. Finally, the State and district court 
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are collaterally estopped from re-litigating any limitation of Charles' right to possess firearms 
under the same analysis set forth in Section IV(C)(2)--that issue was laid to rest and fairly 
litigated when the district court accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and they are barred from 
re-Iitigating that issue now. Powell, 120 Idaho at 708. The State and district court have breached 
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Charles is entitled to specific performance of his reasonable 
lInderstaflding~that all of his civil rights would be restored. 5'ee Sections III & IV(A)-(B). 
Third, Charles has a right under United States Constitution and federal law to bear 
fiream1s once his guilty plea is set aside-since Idaho law does not expressly bar or limit him 
from possessing firearms, and, in fact, restores all of his civil rights. I.e. § 19-2604(1); Hanes II, 
139 Idaho at 394 ("The statute does not contain the word 'willfully"'); Manners, 107 Idaho at 
952; u.s. v. Gomez, 911 F.2d 219, 222 (9th 1990) ("Because Idaho has no such express 
provision in its code, we must overturn Gomez's conviction"); u.s. v. Erlvin, 902 F .2d 510, 513 
(7th Cir. 1990) ("A state must tell the felon point blank that weapons are not kosher"); 18 USe. 
§ 921(1)(20); U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 11; U.S. CONST. Amend IT; I.C. 18-310(2). There are no 
Idaho laws or statutes (including I.e. § 18-310(2» that limit or prevent a defendant with a 
dismissed withheld judgment from having all of his civil rights restored, including the right to 
bear arms. Once an order is entered setting aside Charles' guilty plea and dismissing this action, 
Charles' civil rights are fully restored under Idaho law, including his right to bear firearms under 
both Idaho and federal law. Id. Furthermore, his right to bear firearms under federal law and the 
United States Constitution trumps any lack of clarity or statute under Idaho law. Id. 
Accordingly, there is no basis under the Idaho law, federal law or the Rule 11 Plea 
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Agreement to limit or bar Charles from having all of his civil rights restored, including his right 
to bear arms. Charles has honored his end of the bargain and the district court and State should 
be required to honor their end. 'R (R . Vol. 11 , p. 247-50, " 19, 11-14 ; App., E, p. 6.) 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons aIiicu lated above. the Court should reverse the district court 's two orders 
and remand this case with instructions to set aside Charles' gui lty plea, restore all of his civil 
rights and dismiss this action. Because this appeal involves the post-sentence and quasi-civil 
matter of enforcing a contract Charles requests an award of costs pursuant to T.A.R. 40. 
DATED this 21 51 day June, 2012. 
RODERICK BOND LA W OFFICE, PLLC 
By:~1( _________ J!{  
Roderick C. Bond 
Attorney tor Defendant-Appellant Charles Earl Guess 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick Bond. declare that, on the 21 Sl day of June, 2012, I served two true and 
correct copies of Appellant's Brief on the following parties via the mcthod(s) indicated below: 
Lawrencc G. Wasden, Attorney Generai 
Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, 10 82720-00 I 0 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Emai'i Chrnent) 
Roderick C. B d 
,& Significantly, if Charles had vio lated probation, the No Contact Order or any other terms of the Ru le I I 
Plea Agreement, he would have breached the Rule II Plea Agreement and lost all of hi s rights to have his gUilty 
plea set aside and his civil rights restored, including the right to possess firearms. (App., A, p. 3.) 
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LATM-l COUf'JTY 
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFIC~ 
JAMES E. M. CRAIG fJYjI.~~~;;:-.:_ flEPU PI 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah Cou~ty Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
MOscow, Idaho 83813-0568 
(208 1 882-8580 Ext. 3316 
ISB No. 6365 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT Ol,~ 7HE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF' IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CHARLES EARL GUESS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2006-0001646 
RULE 11 PLEA AGREEMENT 
CO:'1ES NQI'J T:-IE STATE OF IDAHO, by and through its attorney, 
James E. Iv1. Craig, Dop'Jty Prosecuting Attorney, and Defendant 
CHARLES EARL GUESS, and his attorney, Wynn Mos:rcan, and p,lrsuant to 
Rule ll(d) (1) (Cl, Idaho Criminal R'Jles, sub~it the following Plea 
Agreenent to the Court for its acceptance or rejection: 
1. That the Qefendant shall enter a guilty plea in Latah 
County Case CR-2006-0001646 to a single count of 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, Idaho Code 18-901, a felony, 
written to include both victims, as stated in the 
I1.mendod CrirLinal Info::::mation to be filed at the 
a::::raignment of the ~atter herein; 
2. That the State and the Defe~dant agree that th~ 
appropriate disposition of this ~atter is as follows: 
RU~E 11 PLEA AGREEME~T: Page -1-
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That the Defendant shall receive a Withheld Judgment 
ar.d shall be placed or. probation ~o the Idaho State 
Department of Corrections for a period of no more than 
five (5) years . Terns of the Defendant ' s probation 
shall include : 
A. That the Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount 
of $1 , 000 . 00 ; 
B. That the Defendant shall serve thirty (30) days 
l ocal jail; 
3 . That any other terms of sentencing and conditions of 
probation , including (bu t not limited to) the lcr-gth of 
probation and the amount of restitution , arc not the 
subject of this agreement , and both part ies "are free to 
make what recommendations they believe to be 
appropriate. 
4 . Defendant understands (a) the nature of the charge to 
'tlhieh he agrees to plead guilt y and acknowledges t hat 
he is not being coerced into entering his plea of 
guilty ; (b) the consequences of pleadir:g guilty, 
incl u d ing the ma ximum penalties tha t may be i mposed and 
any mandatory min i mum pena lties ; and that (c) by 
pleading gc:ilt y he vJill waiv e his rights to a jury 
trial, to confront accusers, and to refrain from 
incriminati r:g himself . Defendant further acknmvl edges 
that he is satisfied with his lega l representation , has 
reviewed "lith his attorney all possible defenses, and 
by his plea of guilty voluntarily \vaives those 
defenses. Defendar..t also understands that he has a 
r ight to appeal the judgment and sentence of the Court 
herein and hereby freely and voluntarily waives such 
appeal rights and his right to appeal any subsequent 
decisions of the Court relative to motions for 
r educt i on of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 . 
5 . This agreement lsentered into pursuant to r.C . R. 
11 (d) (I) (C) ; Defendant understands if the Court does 
not accept the sentencing recommendations of the 
parties that. he shall be afforded the opportunity to 
withdraw h i s plea of guilty except as provi ded below . 
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6. This plea agreement i s based upon the fac ts and 
circu~stances as they exist at the date of the signing 
o f 'chis agreement. The defendant acknowledges , 
covenants and agrees that during the period of time 
betl'/een the date of this agreement and the date of 
sentenc ing, he wil l not vio late any law nor fail to 
comply \'lith any conditions of his release on bond or 
othe r conditions ordered by the Court , and shall 
cooperate fu lly wi th any p resen t ence investigat i on 
ordered herein . Should the efendantin any way breac~ 
these agreements and covenants , the State is released 
from any obligations hereunder regard'ng an appropriaLe 
sentencing dis osition, the Court may senLence the 
defendant up to the maxirnwn authorized by _aw and the 
defendant shall not be afforded the opporlunity to 
·.oJ· thdraw his plea of guilty . The defendant expressly 
agrees that the burden of proof for determining whethe r 
the defendant has breached any of sa id agreements or 
covena~t s shall be a preponderance of the evidence 
only . 
7 . This is the ent i re agreement a~d unders tand ing between 
the parties. 
IT IS SO STIPULATE D this 
J E. t1. C::zAIG 
eputy pros7 9 
l b day of June , 2 0 06 . 
--- h~~Jk " -------. 
~lYNN lOSf'.1AN 
Coun e1 forJlDefendant 
~
.? . 
" ',/~a-r .' ~ ~ ~t-~ __ ~ 
C RLES EARL GUESS 
Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




Case No. CR-2006-0001646 
ORDER WITHHOLDING ENTRY 
OF JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
On the 31st day of August, 2006, tte defendant, CHARLES EARL 
GUESS, defendant's counsel, Wynn Mosman, and the State's at~orney, 
James E. M. Craig, appeared before this Court for pronouncement of 
judgment. 
At that time the defendant vJas again advised that an Amended 
Criminal Information had been filed charging the defendant with the 
ORDER WITHHOLDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER OF PROBATION: Page -1-





felony offense of AGG::~.l\'vATED l-\SSAULT, Idal:o Code 18-901, 905, 906, 
a felony, co:nrdtted on 0:::- about tl:e 25th day of April, 2006, and 
that on June 19, 2006, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to 
such charge which plea was accepted by the Court. 
Based upon the Presentence the 
any, of in and in 
, the , and any statertu:mt-s the 
the Court finds that the interests of 
be served if the of were 
on to the Idaho State Board of 
Good cause 
BE WITHHELD and the de be on PROBATION to 
State of FOR A PERIOn OF FIVE (5) YEARS 
COMMENCING AUGUST 31, 2000, upon the ::ollowing terms and 
conditions: 
(1) Laws and Cooperation: The defendant shall respect and 
obey all city, county, state and federal laws and have no 
law violations (other than a traffic infraction as defined 
by the state of Idaho), and shall comply with all lawful 
requests of his supervising probation officer including, 
but not limited to, participation in the intensive 
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supe~vision caseload. 
(2) Residence: The defendant shall not change residence 
without first obtaining permission f~om defendant's 
supervising probation officer. 
(3) Reports: The defendant shall submit a written, truthful 
report to defendant's supervising probation officer each 
and every month and shall report in person on dates and 
at times specified by such probation officer. 
(4 ) TraveL: The defendant shall not leave Idaho or 
defendant's assigned probation district of Lewis, Idaho, 
Clearwater, Nez ?erce, and Latah counties without first 
obtaining written ssion of defendant's supervising 
probation officer. 
(5) EmpLoyment: The defendant shall seek and maintain 
gainful employment and, once such employment is secured, 
shall n,ot change that employment or 'cause it to be 
terminated 'iIi thout first obtaining l.,;rri t Len pernission 
from defendant's suporvising probation officer; or, in 
the alternative, if defendant chooses to pursue education 
in a program approved by defendant's supervising 
probation officer, defendant shall enroll in such a 
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program and not chQnge his course o~ study or drop out 
without prior written Dermission of such probation 
officer. 
(6) Alcohol: The defendQnt shall not conSL:r:le or possess 
alcoholic beverages in any form and will not enter upon 
any establishment where the sQle of alcohol for 
consL:mption on the premises is a primary SOL:rce of 
income; the defendant shall submit to tests of 
defendant's bodily fluids for traces of alcohol at the 
defendant's own expense whenever requested by defendant's 
supervising proba~ion officer or any agent of the 
Division of Probation and Parole of the Idaho State Board 
of Correction. The defendan~ shall submit to any Lesting 
deened necessary by the defendant's probation officer to 
deLermine if the de=endant has an alcohol abuse problem. 
The de~endanL shall al~o submit to any counseling for 
alcohol abuse deemed warranted by the defendant's 
probation officer. 
(7 ) Controlled Substances: The defendant shall not use or 
possess any contro'led substance unless la,;vfully 
prescribed for defendanL's use by a licensed physician or 
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dentist; the defendant shal_ subKit to tests of 
defendant's bodily fluids for traces of controlled 
substar.ces at the defendant's own expense whenever 
requested by defendant's supervising probation office- or 
a~y agent of the Division of Probation and Parole of the 
Idaho State Board of Correction. The de~e~dant shall 
submit to any testing deemed necessary by the defendant's 
probation officer to determine if the defendant has a 
substar.ce abuse p:::-oblem. The defendant sha 1 also submit 
to any counseling for substance abuse deemed warranted by 
the de;endant's p:::-obation officer. 
( 8) Weapons: The defendant shall not purchase, carry, or 
have in his possession any firearms or weapons. 
(9 ) Search: The defendant shall submit to a search of 
defendant's persor., vehicle, residence, and/or property 
conducted in a reasonable manner and at :::-easonable times 
by ar.y agent of the Division of Probation and Parole of 
the Idaho State Board of Correction in order to determine 
whethe:-:: or not the defendanL is complying wi L:1 Lhe terms 
and conditions of his probation. 
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(10) Payments: The defendant shall: 
(a) Pay restitution in an amount to be determined at a 
restituLion hearing scheduled for November 2, 2006, 
at 4:00 p.m.i 
(b) Pay a fi:1e of $1,000.00; 
(c) Pay court costs of $97.50; 
Total $1097.50 
The total of such s,-:n,s shall be paid to the clerk of this 
Court in such reasonable installments as may be agreed to 
by the defendant and Lhe defendant's probation officer. 
To the extent tf:at the defendant and the defendant IS 
probation officer are unable to reach an agreement, the 
cO:lrt 'dill deLermine a reasonable amount of payments. In 
any event, all such sums shall be paid in full prior to 
Lhe defendant's release from probation. All payme:1ts 
shall be made by cash, castier's or certified check or 
money order, and no personal checks will be accepted. 
The defendant shall also be required to pay a $2.00 
processing fee with each installment. 
(11) Costs of Probation Supervision: The defendant i,ill 
co:mply with Idaho Code 20-225 by paying a fee of not :more 
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than $50.00 per month to the Idaho Department of 
Correction to he~p defruy the costs of defendant's 
probation supervision at such times and in such aFounts 
as his probaLion officer may direct. 
(12) Association: Tie defendant shall not assoc~ate with 
person (s) with \<ihom defendant's supervising probation 
officer directs him noL Lo associate. 
(13) Duration: Probution has been ordered for a specific 
length of time; hO'l'iever, probation shall not be 
terminated until the Court has both reviewed the 
performance of the probationer and has signed an order 
discharging the probationer. Probation is subject to 
extension for non-pay,nent of costs, fines, and 
restitution or for unsatisfactory performance. 
Special Conditions of Probation: 
(14) Incarceration: The defendant shall serve thirty (30) 
days in the Latah County jail with credit for ten (10) 
days served. The defendant shall report to the Latah 
County Jail by 6:00 p.m. on August 31, 2006. 
(15) Mental Health Counseling: The defendant shall at Lend 
and complete such mental health counseling as his 
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probation officer may designate. 
( 1_ 6) No Con tact Order: The defendant shall have no contact 
with the victims herein outside legal proceedings. 
(17) Community Service: The defendant shall perform one 
hundred (100) hours of co:nmuni",=y service at such \"ork 
si tes as may be approved by defendant 1 S s:lpervising 
probation officer. Additionally, the defendant shall pay 
a fee 0:: $.60 per hour of cOfl"h"'":1Unity service v;ork pursuant 
to Idaho Code 31-3201C, which shall be paid to the Latah 
CO:lnty Treasurer who shall transmit ~he same to the State 
Insurance Fund. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that a restitJtion hearing shall be 
scheduled for November 2, 2006, at 4:00 p.m. or as soon thereafter 
as can be heard. Sho:lld restitution be stipulated to prior to the 
restitution hearing, said hearing shall be vacated. 
FURTHER, in accordance 'iii th the Idaho DNA and Genetic l'1arker 
Database nct of 1996, I.C. 19-5501 et. seq:, the defendant shall 
submit a DNA sample and thumbprint. 
O}I,?ED this ~ ~ day of 
August 31, 2006. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
7 do hereby certify that ful2.., tc::ue, complote and correct 
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1 respect to the motion to enforce the Rule 11 Agreement, I'm 
2 denying that motion. And I'm denying that with prejudice, 
3 and if you want to me to certify it for purposes of appeal, 
4 I'll be happy to do that, Mr. Bond. I don't think that the 
c Rule 11 Agreement, as crafted, can be enforced in the way 
E that you seek to have it enforced at this juncture. 
7 There's a lot of water under the bridge here, and 
8 I think to get back to my earlier observation, this is a 
S dynamic process. And in order for me to restore Mr. Guess's 
Ie rights I have to find that it is compatible with the public 
11 interest, and I have to do that now as opposed to when I 
12 entered the withheld judgment. 
1= That isn't to say that I will never grant the 
14 relief requested by Mr. Guess, it's that at this juncture I'm 
1~ unprepared to do so. so, to the extent that it's a motion to 
16 reconsider, I'm denying that, as well, but I'm denying that 
17 without prejudice. 
18 I think there will come a time when Mr. Guess1s 
1~ rights will be restored. I can't tell you when that time 
2C will be, but I thin.k given the showing that I have seen, 
21 given the contrition that I have seen, given the 
22 rehabilitation that I have seen, I think Mr. Guess is on the 
2~ right track as far as having me grant the relief that he 
24 requests. 
2: DO I think that I'm bound to do it by the Rule 11 
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1 Agreement? I don't think so. And if I were -- if I thought 





I think that's a dynamic process, and I have to make a 
determination independent of the granting of the withheld 
judgment to grant the relief that's requested by Mr. Guess at 
this juncture. 
I can tell you I haven't ever seen the showing 
that was made by Mr. Nevin at the last hearing as it relates 
<; to someone's rehabilitation. Mr. Guess is clearly contrite. 
lC He's remorseful. He has done all that he can do in order to 
11 be awarded the rel ief that he seeks today. But I thi nk 
lL there's a twofold determination. Not only must I determine 
1_ that he has done everything that he can do, but that it would 
14 be compatible with public interest. 
1: I'm not saying that Michele Guess's acquiescence 
IE in this request is what needs to occur. I can tell you that 
17 if she had no objection, I would grant it, though. But at 
18 some point I may conclude that that acquiescence will never 
IS be forthcoming and that it is yet compatible with the public 
2C interest to grant Mr. Guess the relief he requests. 
21 That may come as a big disappointment to 
22 Mr. Guess. It may come as some recognition that he has hope 
2 that I will at some point grant him the relief he requests. 
24 This is a tough case. I don't think there's any 
2 C doubt about it. But I don't think the Rule 11 Agreement 
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otherwi se cl ear. 
MR. BOND: okay. okay. 
THE COURT: And I'm -- I may be conflating the 
4 civil rules with the criminal rules in telling you that. 
MR. BOND: That's -- that's my problem half the 
E time. I keep going back to the civil rule on 
7 reconsideration. I was thinking, is there reconsideration 
8 with. 
THE COURT: well, and as I say, I'm -- this is a 
1 C dynami c process. And I thi nf< if Mr. Guess stays on the 
11 trajectory that he's on that at some point. even if Michele 
12 Guess continues to object, I would find the relief. he 
13 requests meritorious. 
14 MR. BOND: So -- so, just to cl ari fy, Your Honor, 
I" so I -- I -- so that I know I understood you right, did. you 
IE say earlier that if Michele didn't object, then you would 
17 grant the relief? 
18 THE COURT: I did. 
MR. BOND: okay. okay. 
2C THE COURT: whether that's possible is anybody's 
21 guess. 
22 MR. BOND: okay. 
23 THE COURT: No pun intended. 
24 MR. BOND: So, that's what you're really hinging 
2::: the -- the compatible with public interest: is, whether if 
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1 Michele is -- your concern over Michele? 
2 THE COURT: That's my current reservation. 
MR. BOND: okay. okay. And -- and just so that 
4 Charles knows, is there -- is there anything else that he 
2 needs to be doing to somehow help the process along or just 
E continue to be a law abiding citizen? 
7 THE COURT: Continue to be a law abiding citizen. 
8 continue to do the things that he's done in the time that 
~ he's been on probation. AS I said. I don't think I've ever 
1C seen a showing as positive as I saw for Mr. Guess. And my 
11 hesitancy is based on the compatibility with the public 
12 interest, and Michele Guess as a victim of this offense, 
13 carries no small amount of voice in that. 
14 MR. BOND: And -- and then, Your Honor, lastly, 
I" is there -- I mean, just so -- I mean, Charles hasn't made 
IE any decisions. But, I mean, how -- what's a reasonable time 
17 that -- you know, I -- I don't want -- we don't want to be 
18 bothering the court, you know, as we could well know for 
IS bringing motions back, or. 
2C THE COURT: well, they tell me I'm not supposed 
21 to give advisory opinions, and I have bridled at that ever 
22 since I've been at the bench because I don't think it does me 
2~ any good to hold my cards close to my chest, but I can't tell 
24 you 
22 MR. BOND: okay. 
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So, that's my argument. And I appreciate your hearing me 
2 out. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Nevin. Mr. Thompson, 
4 I believe that a victim is entitled to make a statement. Is 
~ there -- does MS. Guess wish to make a statement? 
E MS. GUESS: Yes, I do. 
7 MR. THOMPSON: well J Your Honor t Ms. Guess and I 
t have spoken, and she can speak for herself as far as what --
s what her feelings are about this. 
1C THE COURT: Ms. Guess. 
11 MS. GUESS: Thank you -- thank you -- thank you, 
12 Judge. YOU know, I believe in resolution. But I also 
I: believe that I have my rights, too, as a victim. And the law 
14 is the law. And I believe that your decision will be 
E honored. 
IE I do wish to continue my relationship with my 
17 son. And I would also like to tell you that I still have 
18 some fear. I will never probably resolve that and neither 
Ie will my immediate family. 
2C so, it's your decision, Judge. And I have 
21 written a letter to you in the very beginning telling you my 
22 feelings about my position. And to this point, you know, I, 
2::: as a victim, will always be in fear of Mr. Guess. So, it's 
24 your decision, Judge. And thank you for letting me speak. 
2~ THE COURT: You're welcome. And thank you. 
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1 Mr. Thompson, would you like to be heard? 
2 MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I just, for the 
record, since I believe my responses to the motion have 
4 mostly been from correspondence, the State is not aware of 
~ any legal basis as far as a probation violation or any 
E noncompliance with probation on the part of Dr. Guess that 
7 would forbid him seeking this relief. we believe it's a 
8 matter of court's discretion. I think the statute talks 
S about if the court believes that the relief is consistent 
10 with the interests of justice. 
11 I certainly know that historically the court has 
12 granted this kind of relief in virtually every case that 
1 comes before it where there's been no noncompliance -- I'm 
14 sorry for the double negative -- with probation, but the 




THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Nevin? 
MR. NEVIN: NO, Your Honor. Thank you. 
(PAUSE IN THE PROCEEDINGS) 
IS THE COURT: well, I would say that this is a hard 
20 case. On one side, X have a defendant who has performed as 
21 we 11 as any defendant I can remember whi le on probati on. I 
22 have thoughtful and numerous letters from people who 
2 apparently know the defendant and can vouch for him and his 
24 performance while on probation. 
2" On the other side of the scale. I have what is 
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abominable behavior which resulted in a plea of guilty being 
2 tendered by the defendant and a victim who is the mother of 
the d~fendant's son, and who apparently still is in fear of 
the defendant. That doesn't make for an easy decision. 
(PAUSE IN THE PROCEEDINGS) 
THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion and do 
7 deny the motion. I'm doing so without prejudice, which 
8 means, Ms. Guess, that if Mr. Guess wishes to rebring the 
motion in the future, he would be able to do so. 
1 I think Mr. Thompson is correct that in virtually 
11 all of these cases in the past where I've been shown what I 
12 have been shown in this case,I have granted the motion. I 
1 don't remember a case in the past in which a victim testified 
14 against the motion, frankly. So, the motion is denied 
1
e without prejudice. 
1 Mr. Thompson, would you submit an order to that 
17 effect, please? 
18 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. 
1 THE COURT: IS there anything else we need to 
2 take up? 
21 MR. NEVIN: NO, Your Honor. 
22 MR. THOMPSON: I don't know of anything, Judge. 
2 THE COURT: We are in recess. 
24 (COURT RECESSED AT 9:52 A.M.) 
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPTION 
2v _____________________________________________________________ ~ 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
2 THE COURT: In talking to you today, it strikes 
~ me that English is your primary language. Is English your 









THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have you studied other languages? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. Latin. 
THE COURT: How many years of Latin did you 
THE DEFENDANT: One year in college in 19 -- in 
THE COURT: Are you able to read and understand 
1~ the documents contained in this file? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
I.': THE COURT: Are you able to understand what I am 
IE saying to you today? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: what have you been charged with? 
THE DEFENDANT: I've been charged with aggravated 
2C assault. 
21 THE COURT: And my understanding is that you're 
22 pleading pursuant to a Rule 11 Agreement; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: why don't you explain to me what your 
2.': understanding is of what will happen to you if I accept that 
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1 plea. 
2 THE DEFENDANT: well, my understanding is that 
there will be a presentencing investigation and then a 
4 sentencing hearing. 
THE COURT: And do you understand that the 
E agreement contemplates that you would receive a withheld 
7 judgment as a result of pleading guilty to this charge? 
8 THE DEPENDANT: Yes, si. r. 
THE COURT: DO you know what a "wi thhe 1 d 
1 C judgment" means? 
11 THE DEPENDANT: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: Why don f t you exp 1 ai n to me what 
13 you're understanding is. 
14 THE DEFENDANT: well, I mean that -- I guess, I'd 
1" explain that-- my understanding of the entire agreement is 
IE that I -- that I am pleading guilty to this charge and that I 
17 will spend -- my punishment will include 30 days in 
18 incarceration in the Latah county jail. I will pay a $1,000 
E fi ne. And I 1 In P 1 eadi ng gu; 1 ty to one of the -- one of the 





I fulfill the period of probation without any problems in 
that period of time,that the felony charges would ",,- would 
be dropped. 
MR. MOSMAN: Judge, if I might? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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1 MR. MOSMAN: I may have misunderstood my client. 
2 Or I thought -- I understood him to say that he -- he thought 
that he would have a year period of probation. And I -- I 
4 now understand him to have said that he understands that he 
o will have a period of probation and he knows that will be 
E determined by the Court. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: okay. 
8 THE COURT: well, Mr. Guess, the -- I think you 
s understand what a withheld judgment means. It means that if 
lC you comply with your terms and conditions of probation that 
11 at the conclusion of the period of probation, which is for a 
12 period of no more than five years, according to the 
13 agreement, that you could come in and petition to have your 
14 guilty plea, which you tendered today, withdrawn and the 
1~ charge against you dismissed. 00 you understand that? 
IE THE DEFENDANT: I do, yes. 
17 THE COURT: I'm going to order a presentence be 
18 prepared. I'm going to order that it be prepared no later 
1~ than August 14. I will schedule sentencing in this matter 
2C for August 21st at 4:00 p.m. 
21 
22 
Mr. Mosman, if you have witnesses whom you wish 
to present in response to or in rebuttal of the presentence, 
you'll need to notify the State of that no later than the 
24 17th of August. I'm sure that's -- is the 21st of August 
2~ available to both counsel? 
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THE COURT: I make the following findings and I 
2 draw the following conclusions, I find that Mr. Guess is 
- intelligent and articulate. I clearly find that he 
4 understands the nature of the offense with which he has been 
~ charged. I also find that Mr. Guess understands the 
E consequences of pleading guilty to the charge against him in 
7 the amended criminal information. And I find that there is a 
8 factual basis for the guilty plea tendered by Mr. Guess. I 
S also conclude that the guilty plea is freely and voluntarily 
Ie given. I accept that guilty plea and order that it be 
11 entered in the record. I am reserving acceptance of the Rule 
12 11 plea Agreement until after I've had an opportunity to 
13 review the presentence report. Is there anything else we 
14 need to take up? 
Ie MR. CRAIG: YeS, Your Honor. The State would ask 
IE that you renew the NO Contact order. The No Contact order 
17 has previously ordered Mr. Guess to stay farther than 100 
18 feet away from the victims. Mrs. Guess has asked that that 
IS footage be increased. I'd ask that you increase it to 300 
2C feet. 
21 THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
22 MR. MOSMAN: NO, Your Honor. I assume that 
counsel and the Court may be aware that, as I indicated 
24 earlier, there is a divorce action, and I assume that there 
2~ are going to be appearing in court together. 
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or evidence by way of aggravation that you would like to 
2 present? 
MR. CRAIG: NO, Your Honor, thank you. 
4 THE COURT: Then, Mr. Mosman, this is your 
~ opportunity to make argument with respect to sentencing. I 
E -- I am prepared to accept the Rule 11 Agreement and will be 
7 bound by it. 
8 MR. MOSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. with that 
~ being said, as I understand it, and the Court has indicated 
1C that you'll follow the Rule 11 plea Agreement, and with Mr. 
1 -- or Or. Guess will be sentenced in accordance with that --
12 THE COURT: Yes. 
1:3 MR. MOSMAN: -- I know that Dr. Guess has 
14 prepared a statement for the Court today, and I think he 
E would like to speak to the Court. And I don't know when the 
1E Court would like to hear from him. 
17 I do know that Dr. Guess has also asked me to 
18 express his appreciation to Mr. craig and his office and 
1 C their willingness to grant us some additional time to prepare 
2C for today's hearings, mostly Your Honor for doing so. He's 
21 also asked me to express his appreciation to the Sheriff's 
22 Office, who by his own description, acted as total 
2_ professionals throughout this case, and he very much 
24 appreciates what they have done. 
2~ Your Honor, I think with that then, given the 
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1 minutes after they got upstairs is when they made that phone 
2 call. And the phone call on the cell phone records -- and he 





shows it at 6:04 p.m. 
So, judging by her cell phone records, the time 
period of that Michele Guess gave appears to be more accurate 
than the time period that Mr. Guess gave. 
That being said, I do think that the Rule 11 plea 
Agreement is appropriate, and I ask that you follow that plea 
Ie agreement. However, given the seriousness of the crime, and 
11 the fear that MS. Guess fears -- or has for Mr. Guess, I ask 
12 that you impose the full five years' probation to protect and 
1 give MS. Guess a feeling of safety, at least in that five 
14 years' term of probation. 
1~ Also ask that you impose asa specific term of 
IE probation, again, to help alleviate some of Ms. Guess's fears 
l' that Mr. Guess not be allowed to possess any firearms. I do 
18 recognize that if he was to possess a firearm, it would be a 
IS separate crime, but I think it's important that be a specific 
2C condition of probation, as well. 
21 For restitution, I'm going to ask that you leave 
22 that open at this time. crime victims compensation has paid 
2 some money, but they are still looking -- still 
24 investigating. They have several more bills coming in that 
2~ they're investigating. so, I ask that you leave restitution 
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1 not p 
MR. MOSMAN: NO, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: e ea 
• I am s case. I am 
Mr. r 
my standard terms tions, which would i he 
not consume any r in any ness 
rates a majo ty of its income rough the sale 
ic rages. 
worry 
There are components of this file that lead me to 
substance abuse, and so I think alcohol, 
a substance, but in my experience, it tends to be 
with some regula would fall within that 
2 prohibition. 
21 I am orde ng a fine in the amount $1,000. I 
22 am i days incarce on here locally. I am 
i court costs in amount $97.50. 
24 in terms 
ons, 
SHERYL CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
(509)386-6970 - email: grnail.com 
119 
extent 
7 I nk it's important Mr. Guess 
8 
I am not imposing a 1 j in sease. 
I 1 courts will more 
11 vely I can. 
I am orde as a term tion of 
1-:> p on Mr. Guess not contact wi r 
14 Michele Guess or 1 p ngs, 
so that contacting Mrs. Guess a c viol on 
L of your term and condition of p on, Mr. Guess. were 
17 you to do that, that would be a very g problem for you, not 
18 just in this case, but in other cases. 
1 I believe that submitting to DNA testing is 
2 red by statute, so I am imposing One of 
21 reasons I was 11i to e 11 
22 Mr Guess, Y. is or i 
numerous e It's rare 
24 I see someone 
2:: I 
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service. They say wo is for the , Mr. Guess. 
I think if you were back working again, it would be the 
best thing for you. 
another question, but 
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I 
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so, I'm not in 1i 11 
7 in rease, I in my 
" c ence in numerous 1 
me as someone d a 
.£ 
11 
11 it is you to learn i 
12 I so statement was ne 
t. I'd zes is not 
It's i 
I statement, out 
17 I'll candid, Mr. Guess. you don't seem to 
18 have gotten it, if you do things that you are prohibited 
1 by terms and condi ons p on, then I don't have 
2( many options available to me. 1 can't impress upon 
21 enough how important it is r you to toe 1 i ne to 
is Good 1 to you. 
THE DEFENDANT: you. 
24 THE COURT: IS re se we to 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE. 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V.' 








Case No. CR-2006-01646 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
WITHHELD JUDGMENT 
The Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss Withheld Judgment" having come on for 
hearing before the Court by conference call on November 16, 2011; the Defendant 
appearing by telephone with his attorneys, David Nevin and Annie McDevitt; the State 
appearing telephonically through the Latah County Prosecuting Attorney; and the victim, 
Michelle Guess, appearing telephonically; the Court having heard the arguments pf the 
parties, the statement of the victim and having reviewed the file including the Defendant's 
submission of letters in support of his motion, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, good cause appearing; 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHHELD 
JUDGMENT: Page -1-
Appendix - 0 - Page - 1 212 
It is HEREBY ORDERED that the 
BE 
by the Court on the 
DATED this ----'-__ 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHHELD 
-2-




CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHHELD JUDGMENT were served on the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Annie McDevitt '" f\ [-,lV.S. Mail 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett ~] Overnight Mail 
[] Fax P.O. Box 2772 . 
Boise, ID 83701 [ ] Hand Delivery 
William W. Thompson, Jr. [] U.S. Mail 
Prosecuting Attorney [ ] Overnight Mail 
Latah County Courthouse [ hFax 
Moscow, ID 83843 ~J,\!Hand Delivery 
""1 lX£Q~e-(l 
Dated this eX day of-Ne¥ember, 2011. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 









IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













Case No. CR-2006-1646 
ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
ENFORCE RULE 11 PLEA 
AGREEMENT AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
GUILTY PLEA, TERMINATE 
PROBATION, DISMISS ACTION 
AND RESTORE CIVIL RIGHTS 
The Defendant, ChaTles Earl Guess ("Guess"), brought a Motion to Enforce 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement and to Set Aside Guilty Plea, Terminate Probation, Dismiss 
Action and Restore Civil Rights. A hearing on Guess's motion was held on JanuaTY 
26, 2012. The following individuals appeared before this Court: the State's attorney, 
William W. Thompson, Jr.; Guess's attorney, Roderick C. Bond; and Guess. For the 
reasons stated at the hearing and in this Order,. Guess's lllotionwill be denied. 
ORDER DE:N'YING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE RULE 11 
PLEA AGREEMENT AND ORDER 
DE:NYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SF;rr ASIDE GUILTY PLEA, . . . Page 1 
. Append 280 
In April 2006, Guess and his then-wife, Michele Guess ("Michele"), were going 
through a bitter divorce. On April 25, 2006, Guess was being deposed by "Nllchele's 
lawyer, Stanley Welsh ("Welsh") in Lewiston. The deposition adjourned so that 
Guess, Michele, and vVelsh could travel to the Guess's home in rural Latah C01mty to 
physically examine the contents of the couple's home. While there, Michele and Welsh 
went to the home's vault. \Vhile their backs were turned to Guess, he produced a 040 
caliber Glock pistol and moved the slide to indicate a bullet had been advanced into 
the gun's barrel. When Michele and 'Welsh turned around to face Guess, he 
threatened to kill both of them and then commit suicide. Guess then struck Michele 
in the face, twice, with his left hand, while holding the gun in his right. While Guess 
never carried out his threats to kill .:YIichele and her attorney, he was ultimately 
charged with two counts of felony aggTavated assault and one count of misdemeanor 
domestic battery. 
Guess eventually entered into a Rule 11, I.C.R., Plea AgTeement with the State 
on June 16,2006, in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of Aggravated 
Assault, a felony in violation ofl.C. § 18-905. See Rule 11 Plea Agreement at 1. The 
State agreed to recommend that Guess receive a Withheld Judgment and be placed on 
no more than five-years probation with the Idaho Department of Correction. See id. at 
2. This CouTt accepted Guess's plea of guilty to the charge of Aggravated Assault at 
his arraignment, held on June 19,2006. See Ct. 1\ilins. of ".firraignment" at 2. 
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At se:tlLEH1(:lng held on 31, tlus Court parties' Rule 1 
Plea Agreement and the proposed sentence set forth in agreement. See Ct. lvlins. 
of "Sentencing"; Rule 11 Plea Agreenlent. In accordance with that agreement, tIns 
Court entered a "Withheld Judgment and placed Guess on probation with the Idaho 
Department of Correction for a period of five years. Order Withholding Entry of J. 
and Order of Probation (Aug. 31,2006). Guess successfully cOlnpletedhis term of 
probation as of September 1, 2011. See id at 2. Shortly after completing his 
probation, Guess brought a Motion to Dismiss Withheld Judgment. After a hearing 
on that motion, this Court entered an order denying the motion, without prejudice. 
Order Denying Def. 's Nfot. to Dismiss Withheld J. (Dec. 23, 2011). At that time, this 
Court made it clear that Guess was "discharged from probation." fd. at 2. 
Guess now seeks to have his guilty plea set aside, his withheld judgment 
dismissed, and civil rights restored through one of two avenues: (1) thi'ough 
enforcement of the terms of the parties' Rule 11 Plea AgTeelnent, or (2) puisuant to 
I.C. § 19-2604(1). 
ANALYSIS 
1. The unambiguous language of the Rule 11 Plea Ag1:eelllent does not 
authorize the relief Guess seeks. 
Plea agreements are examined by courts in accordance with the standards of 
contract law. State v. Gomez---P.3d---,2011 WL 10855989 *3 (citation omitted). The 
burden of proving the existence of an agreement, and a breach thereof, is on the 
moving pal'ty. State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010). In 
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aeiLerml:tllIlg whether there has been a breach, courts must examine the language of 
the particular agreement. Gomez, ---P.3d---,2011 10855989 *3. an agreement 
is unambiguous, its meaning and legal effect "must be determined from. the plain 
meaning of the [agreemfmt's] own words." Win of 1Vlichigan, Inc. u. Yreha United, 
Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 751, 53, P.3d 330,334 (2002). 
On the other hand, if an agreement is "reasonably subject to conflicting 
int81'pretation, then it is ambiguous." DeLancey u. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63,65,714 
P.3d 32, 34 (1986) (citation omitted). Any ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of 
the defendant. Gomez, ---P.3d---,2011 WL 10855989 *3. (citation omitted). Thus, 
the State must bear the burden for any lack of clarity in the agreement. Peterson, 
148 Idaho at 596, 226 P.3d at 538. In construing that ambiguity in favor of the 
defendant, courts should look to the defendant's "reasonable understanding" of the 
terms of the agreement. ld. This approach also "reflects the proper constitutional 
focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty." leI. quoting U.S. v. De la 
Fuente, 8 F. 3d 1333, 1337,11. 7 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original). 
When district courts give "unqualified approval to a plea agreement they, like 
the parties, become bound by the terms of that agreement." U.S. u. Ritsenw, 89 F. 
3d 392, 401 (7th Cir. 1996); see also State u. Horldey, 125 Idaho 860, 865, 876 P.2d 
142, 147 (App. Ct. 1994). 
In this case, the language of the parties' Rule 11 Plea Agreement is 
unambiguous. The agreement states in relevant part, "the Defendant shall receive 
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not a 
ease. The governing statute for the always 
been § 19-2604(1). statute vests discretion in 
whether should be allowed to withdraw 
charges against him dismissed. The issue is simply not controlled 11 
Agreement into case. It is governed by the application offacts 
to the law and the exercise of this Court's discretion. rte(~11l1eS to 
on 11 
2. to I.C. § it 
A defendant may apply to the court to have his judgment ~.L'OLU.LQ"""-
under I.e. § 19-2604(1), which states in relevant part, 
[u]pon of the defendant and upon showing that: the 
court did not find, and the defendant did not m any probation 
violation proceeding that defendant violated any of terms or 
of probation; ... the court may, if convinced by showing that 
is no longer cause continuing the period and if it be 
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Rule 11 Plea 
IS 
§ 19-2604(1) is 
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prejudice. 
I do certi..fY true, complete, and correct copies of foregoing 
order were delivered by the following methods to the following: 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Roderick C. Bonel 
Attorney at Law 
800 Bellevue Way N.E., Ste. 400 
Bellevue, W A 98004 
U.S. Mail 
[ Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
Lb.,..:7l Hand Delivery ,. ~ 
,[, "l. U.S. Mail 
I( J Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
On this(Cl day of February 2012. 
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Deputy Clerk 
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